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Foreword 
 
The European Citizens‘ Initiative (hereafter ‗ECI‘), the first supranational instrument of direct 
democracy, creates an additional direct link between the European Union citizens and the 
institutions of the Union. As one of the most innovative elements introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the ECI is often considered to bear great potential for the further development of 
transnational democracy. It does, however, also entail a number of (potential) challenges for 
the EU institutions and for politically active citizens – and, in the long term, perhaps also for 
institutions and political actors within the Member States of the Union. 
On 25 January 2011, a month following the settlement of the inter-institutional compromise 
on the final text of the Regulation on the ECI,
*
 the European General Studies Programme of 
the College of Europe organized a one-day workshop to discuss the origin and modalities for 
implementation of the ECI, as well as its possible effect on the political system of the EU. 
Participants included representatives of the Commission, the Parliament and the Belgian 
Presidency, and academics. 
This research paper includes some of the contributions which had initially been prepared for 
this workshop. They have subsequently been extended in light of the discussions held during 
that event and updated in light of subsequent developments. 
The European General Studies Programme of the College and the authors of this online 
publication would like to thank the participants of the workshop – in particular B. Biervert 
(European Commission), D. Wallis (European Parliament), M. Pecsteen (Belgian Presidency), 
T. Chopin (Fondation Robert Schuman), J. De Clerck-Sachsse (IEP Paris/Commission), R. 
Hrbek (University of Tübingen), J. Monar (University of Sussex and College of Europe), and 
C. Leconte (IEP Lille) – for their interesting insights and valuable comments. The authors of 
the present contributions remain, of course, solely responsible for any shortcomings. 
 
Thanks go also to M. Chang for publishing these articles as a Bruges Political Research 
Paper of the European Political and Administrative Studies Department of the College. 
 
 
Bruges, 14 December 2011 
D. Hanf 
Director, European General Studies Programme of the College of Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*See now Regulation 211/2011 of the European Parliament on the Council (OJEU 2011, L 65/1).
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A Preliminary Approach to the Regulation on European Citizens’ Initiative 
from Comparative Constitutional Law  
 
By Víctor Cuesta-López  
 
 
Introduction: a chance for widespread political participation 
The ―Provisions on Democratic Principles‖ included in the consolidated version of the Treaty 
on European Union (arts. 9-12 TEU) propose an intricate model of democracy that combines 
several interrelated principles such as political equality, representation, participation, 
openness and transparency. In particular, art. 11 TEU on participatory democracy refers to the 
important role of European citizens and civil society organisations in EU governance and 
announces a set of mechanisms granting access to EU policy making. Warleigh has stressed 
the value of this provision, arguing that ―the establishment of participatory democracy as one 
of the EU's normative bedrocks is a potentially important step because it makes clear that 
representation, that pillar of liberal democracy, cannot be the sole means to a legitimate 
regime in the EU‖.1 However, we should notice that participation of citizens and civil society 
organisations in EU governance is not conceived in these provisions as an enforceable 
subjective right. As Closa argues, ―the kind of entitlements regulated convey an approach that 
is very much focussed on providing guidelines for the behaviour of the institutions of the 
Union and less so on empowering the citizens‖.2 
Participation by means of civil dialogue (art. 11.2 TEU) and consultation (art. 11.3 
TEU) is mainly reserved for collective actors and normally depends on the possession of 
                         
1
  Warleigh A., ―On the path to legitimacy? A critical deliberativist perspective on the right to the citizens‘ 
initiative‖, in: Ruzza, C. and Della Sala (eds.), Governance and civil society in the European Union: 
Normative perspectives (vol. 1) (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 64. 
2
  Closa C., ―European Citizenship and New Forms of Democracy‖, in: Amato G., Bribosia H. and de Witte B. 
(eds.), Genèse et destinée de la Constitution Européenne: commentaire du Traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l’Europe à la lumière des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d’avenir (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), p. 
1053. 
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some quality or resource.
3
 Moreover, we could argue, as Craig and de Burca do, that ―profit-
making groups outnumber non-profit groups by a very significant margin, and their resources 
are much larger‖.4 As a result, it has been commonly argued that participatory governance 
remains ―fundamentally elitist, characterized by a sort of self-appointed enlightened elite‖.5 
Consultation and civil dialogue could strengthen the contribution of functional interest 
representation to supranational governance but, as Magnette argues, do not ―guarantee a 
progress of enlightened understanding in the citizenry at large‖.6 Hence, these patterns of 
participation do not represent a definitive answer to the democratic challenge facing the EU. 
Considering that further democratisation depends upon widespread political 
participation, we must welcome article 11.4 TEU on European citizens‘ initiative (ECI), a 
device inspired by national constitutionalism that would allow every single national from the 
Member States to trigger the EU law-making process: ―Not less than one million citizens who 
are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the 
Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on 
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties‖. This provision was originally included in the Constitution for 
Europe and was ultimately transposed to the Lisbon Treaty. The proposal for an ECI was 
presented by conventional Jürgen Meyer in the very last session of the constitutional 
Convention. In his amendment to the draft Constitution he argued that ECI aimed, 
                         
3
  Heinlet H., ―Participatoy Governance and European Democracy‖, in: Kohler-Koch B. and Rittbergerr B., 
Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), p. 
225. 
4
  Craig P. and de Burca G., EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
165.  
5
  Greven M., ―Some Considerations on Participation in Participatory Governance‖, in: Kohler-Koch, B. and 
Rittbergerr, B., Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), p. 241. 
6
  Magnette P., ―European Governance and Civic Participation: Can the European Union be politicised?‖, Jean 
Monnet Working Papers, No. 6, 2001, pp. 32-33. 
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―to bring Europe closer to the people, as Laeken recommended. It represents a large step in the 
democratisation of the Union.  It will extend the existing right of petition to a right of the citizens 
to present legislative proposals to the Commission of the EU‖.7  
 
In fact, by means of ECI, citizens could set the agenda of the EU institutions, 
introducing unattended collective claims into the decision-making process.
8
 In addition, ECI 
could serve to encourage political debate beyond domestic affairs and to construct 
supranational discourses in an emerging European public space. Considering these possible 
effects, Warleigh considers that ―the formal granting of such ability to citizens, acting 
collectively, would be unparalleled in the history of international organisations and would 
thus have potentially enormous significance‖.9 
However, we should avoid high expectations concerning the political potential of the 
citizens‘ initiative. The ECI is a variation of the agenda initiative (also known as indirect 
popular initiative) which is a device of participatory democracy fully subordinated to the 
political will of the legislature that could approve, alter or reject the citizens‘ legislative 
proposals. In fact, the agenda initiative does not have political significance in any of the 
Member States where it has been implemented (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                         
7
  ―The Commission has then to decide whether it will take legislative activity or not. It is very important that 
the threshold for the signatures that are to be gathered for the European Citizens‘ Legislative Submission is 
not too high. A high threshold interferes with the process and effectively allow only powerful organisations 
the possibility of securing the required signatures‖, European Convention, CONV 724/03. 
8
  ―The CI could give everyday citizens the chance to bring completely new ideas into the EU policy-making 
process because in the CI it is citizens who take charge and approach the commission, rather than the 
commission looking for tame interlocutors to beef up the perceived legitimacy of its proposals‖, Warleigh, 
op. cit., p. 66. 
9
  Warleigh, op. cit., p. 64. 
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Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain).
10
 Furthermore, we have to take into account that ECI 
will be subjected to a previous and additional political judgment by the European 
Commission. Moreover in the Member States the submission of an agenda initiative implies 
the beginning of the law-making process, and consequently, only the elected representatives 
are authorized to decide whether the initiative is or is not politically opportune; the ECI would 
be just a preliminary step in the law-making process which is always formally launched by the 
Commission that preserves the monopoly of the legislative initiative. Other additional 
difficulties for the ECI could arise from the diffuse character of the European public opinion 
and the weakness of the transnational civil society networks. 
Let us know consider some other significant similarities and divergences between the 
procedures and conditions laid down in the recently approved Regulation 211/2011/EU of the 
European Parliament and the Council, of 16 February 2011, on the citizens‘ initiative and the 
rules governing other national popular initiatives. The Regulation on ECI came into force on 
April 2011 but its art. 23 declares that the provisions will be not  applied until 1 April 2002. In 
                         
10
  Austria: ―Every motion proposed by 100,000 voters or by one-sixth each of the voters in three States shall be 
submitted by the main electoral board to the House of Representatives for action. The initiative must be put 
forward in the form of a draft law‖ (article 41.2 Constitution); Hungary: ―At least 50,000 voting citizens are 
required for a national popular initiative. A national popular initiative may be for the purpose of forcing the 
Parliament to place a subject under its jurisdiction on the agenda. The Parliament shall debate the subject 
defined by the national popular initiative‖ (article 28-D Constitution); Italy: ―The people may introduce 
public initiatives consisting of a bill drafted in articles and supported by at least 50,000 voters‖ (article 71 
Constitution); Latvia: ―Draft laws may be submitted to the Parliament by the President, the Government or 
committees of the Parliament, by not less than five members of the Parliament, or, in accordance with the 
procedures and in the cases provided for in this Constitution, by one-tenth of the electorate‖ (article 65 
Constitution); Lithuania: “The right of legislative initiative in the Seimas shall belong to the members of the 
Seimas, the President of the Republic, and the Government. Citizens of the Republic of Lithuania shall also 
have the right of legislative initiative. A draft law may be presented to the Seimas by 50,000 citizens of the 
Republic of Lithuania who have the electoral right, and the Seimas must consider such a law‖ (article 68 
Constitution); Poland: ―The right to introduce legislation shall also belong to a group of at least 100,000 
citizens having the right to vote in elections to the House of Representatives (Sejm). The procedure in such 
matters shall be specified by statute‖ (article 118 Constitution);  Portugal: ―The power to initiate laws and to 
propose referenda lies with Deputies, parliamentary groups and the Government, and further, in accordance 
with the terms and conditions established by law, with groups of electing citizens; the power to initiate laws 
with respect to the autonomous regions lies with the appropriate regional legislative assembly‖ (article 167 
Constitution); Slovenia: ―Laws may be proposed by the Government or by any deputy.  Laws may also be 
proposed by at least five thousand voters‖ (article 88 Constitution); Spain: ―An organic law shall regulate the 
forms and requirements for the exercise of the popular initiative for the presentation of proposals of law. In 
any case no fewer than 500,000 valid signatures will be required. This initiative is not applicable to organic 
laws, taxation, or international affairs, nor to the prerogative of pardon‖ (article 87.3 Constitution).  
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the meantime, the Commission have to set up technical specifications for online collection 
systems and the Member States must designate responsible authorities for the verification and 
the certification of the statements of support for the ECI.  
 
The signatories and the organisers of the ECI 
Art. 11.4 TEU reserves the right to support a given citizens‘ initiative to the citizens of the 
Union, that is to say, to the citizens who are nationals of the Member States. It seems, then, 
that there is no scope in the EU primary law for extending this political right to third-country 
nationals residing legally in the Union. It is worth mentioning that while other political rights 
of the European citizens are expressly proclaimed in art 20.2 TFEU (the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate in EP elections, the right of access to documents, the right to refer to the 
European Ombudsman, the right to petition), the right to support an ECI is not enounced as a 
subjective right.  
Art. 3.4 of the Regulation 211/2011 requires that the signatories must be ―of the age to 
be entitled to vote in elections to the European Parliament‖. In order to foster the participation 
of young Europeans, the Regulation could have avoided the reference to the age to be entitled 
to vote in EP elections, which is determined by the Member States, and extended the right to 
support an ECI to EU citizens over sixteen years old. The Opinion of the Committee on 
Petitions on the Commission proposal for a regulation also defended the right to sign an ECI 
to all European citizens over 16: ―A lower age limit is proposed in order to encourage 
younger citizens‘ participation in the democratic life of the Union. The age limit of 16 years 
in case of European election already exists in a certain Member States‖11. Having said that, 
the fact is that in comparative law, the exercise of the legislative initiative is also commonly 
reserved to nationals of legal age who are enrolled in the electoral register. However, we 
should notice a significant exception in the Spanish Autonomous Community of Catalonia, 
                         
11
   Report on the proposal for a regulation on citizens‘ initiative of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A7-
0350/2010), 02.02.2010, p. 59. 
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where the right to sign and to promote a legislative initiative is extended to all foreign legal 
residents over 16 years-old.  
Regarding the amount of statements of support needed for a given ECI, art. 11 TEU 
proposes a fairly low number which represent just 0.2% of the population of the EU. If we 
establish a comparison with the amount of signatures demanded to trigger the agenda 
initiatives in the Member States (Table 1) we realize that only the 50.000 signatures for the 
Italian iniziativa legislativa popolare represents a lower percentage over the total population 
(0.08%) 
 
Table 1: Signatures required for the agenda initiative in the Member States 
Agenda initiative  
 
Population 
(millions, Eurostat 
2010) 
Signatures required Percentage over 
population  
Latvia 2.3  10% (230,000) 10 
Lithuania 3.4  50,000 1.47 
Austria 8.1 100,000 1.23 
Spain 41.6 500,000 1.20 
Portugal 10.4 75,000 0.72 
Hungary 
10.1 50,000 0.49 
Poland 
38.2 100,000 0.26 
Slovenia 
1.9 5,000 0.26 
European Union 
486 1,000,000 0.20 
Italy 57.3 50,000 0.08 
 
Art. 11.4 TUE also declares that the statements of support must come from a 
―significant number of Member States‖. The Regulation 211/2011 determines the territorial 
distribution of the statements of support establishing a threshold of one quarter of the Member 
12 
 
States (7/27).
12
 This proportion was fixed by the EP and amended the original proposal from 
the Commission establishing the minimum number of Member States at one third (9/27).
13
 
The territorial distribution requirement is a logical consequence of the transnational 
dimension of the Union, but it also has some precedents in comparative law. In Romania, for 
example, the supports for the initiative amending the Constitution must come from at least the 
half of the administrative departments and the supports for the legislative initiative must come 
from one quarter of the administrative departments. In several states in the United States, the 
territorial distribution of signatures supporting popular initiatives is pretty common. For 
example, in Alaska the signatures must come from ¾ of the constituencies, in Arkansas from 
15 of the 75 counties, and in Florida from 12 of the 23 constituencies. An additional important 
point about the territorial distribution is the minimum number of statements of support 
required in each Member State. Article 7.2 of the Regulation has chosen a minimum absolute 
number that corresponds to the number of the members of the EP elected in each Member 
State, multiplied by 750. In comparative law, a similar precedent comes again from the United 
States, where it the support of a minimum percentage of voters in each relevant 
county/constituency is normally required.  
The Regulation on ECI assigns a legal status to the organisers of the initiative. As well 
as the signatories, organisers must be citizens of the Union and be of the age to vote in EP 
elections. The organisers will have to constitute a citizens‘ committee ―of at least seven 
                         
12
  The territorial distribution of signatures is determined in comparative law following two different techniques: 
either through a maximum number of signatures coming from a territory o or through a minimum number of 
territories contributing with a minimum number of signatures. Auer also considers that ―the distribution 
requirement can be established by different methods. One method is to define a maximum number of 
signatures coming from one Member State, e.g., 25%, meaning that additional support from one state would 
have no legal value and that at least four states must be implicated. Another method would determine a 
minimum number of states, e.g., eight, contributing with a minimum number of signatures, e.g., 50,000, thus 
allowing one highly motivated state to produce as many as 650,000 signatures‖, Auer A., ―European 
Citizens‘ Initiative‖, European Constitutional Law Review, No. 1, 2005, p. 81. 
13
  The original proposal from the Commission fixed the minimum number of Member States at one third. This 
draws on other provisions of the Treaty, according to which nine or one third of Member States is sufficient 
to ensure the representation of a Union interest. It is the threshold used in the provisions on ―enhanced 
cooperation‖ or needed to trigger the subsidiarity procedure‖, European Commission, Proposal for a 
regulation on the Citizens‘ Initiative, COM(2010)119 final, p. 4. 
13 
 
natural persons who are resident of at least seven different Member States‖ (art. 3.2). The 
constitution of an ad hoc sponsor committee to promote a popular initiative is an extended 
requirement in comparative law: seven is also the minimum number of citizens that must 
constitute the committee to promote the popular initiative in Switzerland. Spanish law, in 
contrast, declines to set a minimum or maximum number of members of the committee. 
Regarding the territorial distribution of the organisers among seven Member States, we could 
say that this additional requirement has no precedents in comparative law. The citizens‘ 
committee enjoy a set of procedural rights that guarantee its prominence throughout the 
process. Among the list of functions assigned to the organisers, we should mention the 
registration of the legislative proposal with the European Commission at an early phase of the 
process (art. 4.1), the translation of the proposed initiatives into other official languages of the 
Union (art. 4.1), the collection of the statements of support (art. 5.1), the submission of the 
statements of support to the relevant Member States to proceed with its verification and 
certification (art. 8.1) and the defence of the legislative demand before the Commission [arts. 
9, 10.1 (b)] and the public hearing at the EP (art. 11) after its submission. The Regulation also 
declares the organisers‘ right to withdraw a registered ECI before the submission for 
verification and certification to Member States (art. 4.5). This is also the case of the popular 
initiative in Switzerland where the absolute majority of the members of the initiative 
committees can demand the withdrawal of a successful request until the day on which the 
Federal Council fixes a date for a popular vote (article 73 Swiss Federal Act on Political 
Rights). Art. 4 of the Regulation 211/2011 requires the publication of ―regularly updated 
information on the sources of support and funding‖ (art. 4). The Regulation does not foresee, 
however, any public funding for the organisers from the EU. By contrast, Spanish legislation 
provides for compensation of the expenses incurred during the signature gathering campaign 
when the agenda initiative reaches legislative process. In Catalonia, the committee of the 
14 
 
initiative can even demand an advance payment before the beginning of the signatures 
campaign. 
 
The registration with the Commission and the decision on the admissibility  
Before the beginning of the collection of the statements of support, the citizens‘ committee 
should register its proposal with the Commission. Regarding the scope of the ECI, the 
organisers must provide information about its subject-matter and its objectives (art. 4.1 
Regulation 211/2011). In particular, the required information for registering a proposed ECI, 
fixed in Annex II, includes the title, the subject matter, the description of the objectives on 
which the Commission is invited to act, the relevant provisions of the Treaties, the personal 
data of the organisers and a declaration about the sources of support and funding. As we can 
see, the organisers of the ECI formulate its proposal in general terms and not as a proper draft 
law. This is a major divergence with many of the expressions of agenda initiative which are 
commonly drafted in a bill. For instance, the Italian agenda initiative must consist ―of a bill 
drafted in articles‖ (article 71 Italian Constitution) and the Austrian Volksinitiative ―must be 
put forward in the form of a draft law‖ (article 41.2 Austrian Constitution). However, there 
are also some examples of popular initiatives formulated in general terms: the Swiss popular 
initiative can be submitted in the form of a general proposal (initiative populaire générale). 
The submission of this kind of popular initiative implies further intervention by 
representatives who would draft the final version presented to popular vote (art. 74.3 Swiss 
Federal Act on Political Rights). 
Before its official registration, the proposed ECI is subjected to a preliminary 
examination by the Commission.  The ECI will not be registered if its subject matter ―falls 
outside the framework of the Commission powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the 
Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties‖ [art. 4.2. a)], that is to say, if it exceeds 
the scope of Commission‘s legislative initiative. In addition, the Commission will reject the 
15 
 
registration if the ECI is ―manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious‖, or ―manifestly contrary 
to the values of the EU set out in art. 2 TEU‖14 [art. 4.2.c), d)]. The constitutional and/or legal 
check of the popular initiatives is a widespread prerequisite that is commonly commended to 
administrative or parliamentary bodies. We should notice that these preliminary examinations 
are not a judgement of political opportunity and operate on the basis of a strict regulatory 
canon. Consequently, a negative decision on a popular initiative‘s registration can be appealed 
by the organisers before the courts. In this regard, art. 4.2 of the Regulation announces the 
right to appeal against a negative decision on the admissibility of a given ECI before the 
European Court of Justice. As well as the Spanish agenda initiative, the preliminary 
examination of the ECI takes place before the beginning of the collection of statements of 
support, thus avoiding the circulation of proposals which in the end could not be admitted and 
the consequent frustration among signatories. Fortunately, the EP suppressed the Commission 
proposal‘s provision establishing that the decision on the admissibility would be adopted after 
the collection of 300,000 statements of support from signatories from at least three member 
states (article 8 of the Commission proposal for a Regulation).
15
 The rapporteurs of the 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the EP did not ―support the idea of this check taking 
place after the collection of 100,000 or 300,000 signatures, as this would rightfully cause 
great frustration to organisers‖.16  
Art. 11.4 TEU and the Regulation 211/2011 do not present a list of particular issues 
excluded from the scope of the ECI. This is good news for the functionality of the ECI 
because in Member States such as Spain or Portugal, the voters cannot promote the adoption 
of statutes concerning fundamental matters. For instance, the Spanish Constitution specifies 
                         
14
  Art. 2 TUE: The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. 
15
  COM(2010)119 final, p. 14. 
16
  Committee on Constitutional Affairs EP, Working Document on a proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the citizens‘ initiative, 22.06.2010, p. 6. 
16 
 
that the bills proposed by citizens shall not proceed ―in matters of constitutional law, tax law 
or of international character, neither in that related to the prerogative of clemency‖. The 
exclusion of ―matters of constitutional law‖ from the scope of the Spanish agenda initiative is 
particularly severe because it implies that citizens may not introduce bills related to 
fundamental rights and public liberties, to the regulation of a good number of institutions and 
constitutional bodies, to the Statutes of Autonomy or the general electoral system. 
Nevertheless, we miss from the Regulation 211/2011 a reference to the single subject 
requisite that is quite extended in comparative law and that guarantees the coherency and 
substantive unity of the proposals presented by the citizens. For instance, in Switzerland, in 
the event that the text of a popular initiative fails to comply with the principles of unity of 
subject matter (Art. 139 paragraph 3 and Art. 194 paragraph 2 Federal Constitution) the 
Federal Assembly declares the initiative to be invalid as a whole or in part, to the extent that 
this is required (art. 75 Swiss Federal Act on Political Rights). Another question to consider 
about the scope of the ECI is whether it could serve to promote the amendment of the 
Treaties. Although the Commission can trigger the ordinary and the simplified revision 
procedures (art 48 TEU), it seems that this is a competence that clearly falls outside the 
ordinary power to submit ―a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties‖ (art. 4.2.a) and consequently an ECI demanding the revision of 
the Treaties could be automatically dismissed.  
Finally, article 4.1, paragraph 6, Regulation 211/2011 foresees the Commission‘s 
assistance for the organisers who want to register a given ECI. This provision granting 
information and legal advice through a ―contact point‖ could be particularly helpful given the 
extraordinary complexity of the EU legal system. This valuable provision has some 
precedents: the sponsor committee of the popular initiative in California enjoys extensive 
17 
 
assistance during the drafting process. The sponsors may take a general proposal to the 
Legislative Counsel, and there a staff member drafts the language of the initiative. 
 
The collection, verification and certification of the statements of support 
The Regulation sets out the official form for the statement of support in annex III.
17
 Only the 
forms written in one of the registered language versions and which comply with the model 
proposed in the annex to the Regulation could be used for the collection of the statement of 
support (art. 5.1, paragraph 2). The personal data required in the forms (full first names, 
family names, permanent residence, date and place of birth, nationality and personal 
identification number) could differ in each Member States in accordance with national laws 
and practices. Concerning the personal data collected from signatories, the Regulation alludes 
in recital 13 to the principle that personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose for the verification of statements of support by Member States. The 
competent authorities will destroy all the statements of support at the latest one month after 
issuing the certification on the number of valid statements (art. 12.3). In comparative law, the 
signature lists (forms, sheets of paper or cards) in support of a given popular initiative must 
also comply with the form prescribed by law. The laws on popular initiatives also determine 
the personal data required from signatories. For instance, Italian legislation on abrogative 
referendum and agenda initiatives similarly demands first name, family name, place and date 
of birth and municipal constituency from citizens. 
Article 5.2 and 6 of the Regulation 211/2011 establish that the statements of support 
could be collected online as well. The organizers must ensure and the competent authority of 
the Member States must certify that the online collection systems have ―adequate security and 
technical features in place‖ before the beginning of the collection campaign. In particular, the 
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  The Commission is empowered to amend that annex taking into account information forwarded to it by 
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18 
 
online collection system must guarantee that only natural persons can submit a statement of 
support, that the data are securely collected and stored and, consequently, that they may not 
be modified or used for any purpose other than the support to a given ECI, and that the 
statement of supports generated complies with the model set out in Annex III [article 6.4.a), 
b), c)]. For that purpose, by 1 January 2012, the Commission would make available an open-
source software incorporating the relevant technical and security features and set out detailed 
technical specifications for online collection systems. Spanish citizens are also allowed to 
express their support for agenda initiatives by way of electronic signature. Art. 7.4 of the 
Constitutional Law 3/1984 merely acknowledges the validity of the electronic signature and 
refers to the "corresponding legislation" for determining the conditions of its implementation. 
Although there is not a specific law regulating electronic signature in support of popular 
initiative, the Junta Electoral Central (the national electoral Committee) has established in a 
Resolution issued on 28 May 2009 that the use of electronic signatures supporting a popular 
initiative must comply necessarily with national Law 59/2003 on Electronic Signature. The 
electoral committee considers that the promoting committee is responsible for proving that its 
own register of electronic signatures fulfils all the technical requirements established in this 
regulation. The Catalonian Law 1/2006 of popular legislative initiative has also provided for 
electronic signatures in the presentation of the initiative, in its first additional Provision. The 
legislator refers in this case to the instructions that the Government of the Generalitat may 
decree in the future, ensuring by all means, the authenticity of the electronic signatures 
presented. It is clear that the electronic signature will multiply the possibilities of success of 
the campaigns considering that a large quantity of potential signatories, who today do not sign 
proposals since they are not in contact with the promoters, may gain direct access to the 
propositions and sign them anywhere.  
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The organisers could extend the collection campaign for twelve months from the date 
of registration of the proposed citizens‘ initiative (art. 5.5 Regulation 211/2011). With the 
exception of the agenda initiative from Portugal where the organizers do not have a specific 
deadline to collect signatures, the laws on agenda initiative from Member States also establish 
a time limit that range between 60 days( Slovenia) and 9 months (Spain). In Switzerland, the 
signature lists for a popular initiative must be submitted together at the latest 18 months from 
the date of publication of the text of the initiative in the Official Federal Gazette. Once the 
collection campaign has expired, the ―relevant competent authorities‖ designated by the 
Member States have to verify and certify the collected statements of support within a period 
of three months (art. 8.2). The verification of the statements of support, which must be done 
―on the basis of appropriate checks‖, could differ according to the national laws and practices 
of the Member States. In any case, the verification could be based on random sampling. There 
are no precedents of this kind of verification method of the signatures in support of a given 
national popular initiatives in the Member States. In European comparative law, the promoter 
submits the signed sheets to the relevant administrative or parliamentary body which verifies 
the registration of all the signatories in the electoral registers and counts the number of valid 
signatures gathered. However, random sampling is a well-known method of signatures‘ 
verification in the U.S.A. This is the case of California, where the county officials choose 
randomly the 3% of the signatures filed in their county (or 500 signatures in case the result of 
the operation is inferior to this amount) and then determine how many of those signatures are 
valid. In counties where 500 or fewer signatures were submitted, the county must inspect all 
the signatures for validity. After the Office of the Secretary of State has collected information 
about validity rates from all counties where signatures were filed, the office applies a formula 
to determine the statewide total of valid signatures (Section 9030-9035 of the California 
Elections Code).  
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The Submission of the ECI to the Commission 
Once the verification of the Statements of support has concluded, the designated authorities of 
the Member States have to issue a document certifying the number of valid statements of 
support received. The organizers will then submit the ECI to the Commission ―accompanied 
by information regarding any support and funding received for that initiative‖ (art. 9, 
paragraph 1). Article 9 refers to the Regulation 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European 
level and the rules regarding their funding in order to set out the amount of support and 
funding received from any source in excess of which information is required.
18
 Such a 
provision has no precedents in European comparative law. Once the ECI has been properly 
submitted, the Commission must publish it in the register and receive the organizers who will 
explain ―in detail the matters raised‖ [article 10.1.a)]. Art. 11 of the Regulation foresees a 
public hearing at the European Parliament for the organisers who will have the opportunity to 
defend the political opportunity of the ECI before the Commission, the MEP and ―other 
institutions and bodies of the as may wish to participate‖. This is a very positive provision that 
would allow the involvement of the citizens‘ committee in the EU democratic deliberations.  
Finally, the Commission has to take a decision, within three months from the date of 
submission, on the political opportunity of the ECI, declaring in a communication the ―action 
it intends to take, if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking that action‖ [article 10.1.c)].  
In this communication, the Commission sets out its ―legal and political conclusions‖ about the 
citizens‘ initiative. This provision is quite confusing given that the ECI had been previously 
subjected to a legal examination by the Commission. We argue that this ―legal conclusion‖ 
could not be a new technical judgment on its admissibility but a final decision on the suitable 
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  ―A political party at European level as well as a political foundation at European level shall declare its 
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2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing 
political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding. 
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kind of legal act chosen in order to draft the ECI (―regulation‖, ―directive‖, or ―decision‖) and 
the appropriate legislative procedure. As Auer argues, it seems that the Commission would be 
entitled ―to change the title, the form and the language of the initiative before it gives its 
formal assent‖.19 It could be desirable that the Regulation had also allowed the participation of 
the citizens‘ committee in the ECI‘s drafting process. The internal regulation of the EU 
legislature, particularly the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, should also grant 
the intervention of the citizens‘ committee along the whole law-making process. In this 
regard, Spanish legislation on agenda initiative allows a person appointed by the promoting 
committee to intervene in defence of the law proposition before the plenary session of the 
Parliament. The agenda initiatives sent to the Parliament of Aragón, the Parliament of the 
Canary Islands and the Parliament of the Balearic Islands may also be defended in the plenary 
session by a member of the promoting committee. In the case of Galicia, the defence may be 
exercised by any of the signatories appointed by the promoters. In Catalonia, the intervention 
of the promoters in the plenary debate is guaranteed by the Regulation of the Chamber: a 
member of the promoting committee opens the plenary debate presenting the proposition in 
fifteen minutes. Furthermore, the Catalonian legislation entails the possibility that the 
promoters may defend the initiative before the legislative committees which could introduce, 
later on, particular amendments to the citizens‘ proposal. 
 
Conclusion 
After this preliminary approach, we could conclude that the Regulation 211/2011 on the 
procedures and conditions required for an ECI has incorporated many of the best practices on 
popular initiative coming from comparative law. In this regard, we could be already optimistic 
about the democratic potential of the ECI. However, it should be noted that the functionality 
of this device will not only depend on a participatory-friendly legal regime. It is also clear that 
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the influence of the ECI on the democratic life of the Union will depend on the receptive 
attitude from institutions towards the reasonable political demands raised by citizens. In 
addition, civil society organisations behind the citizens‘ committees will have to make a 
considerable effort in order to arise political debate beyond domestic affairs and encourage 
EU citizens to become actively involved. Finally, we argue that participatory governance by 
means of citizens‘ initiative is not a definitive solution to improve the democratic quality of 
EU: participation of civil society organisations in the policy-making can never replace spread 
political participation through representation. Direct participation and political representation 
should thus be seen as complementary strategies to democratise the EU. 
Anticipating the attitudes of European civil society organisations to the European 
Citizens‘ Initiative (ECI): which public sphere may it promote?20 
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  Aspects of this paper have been presented earlier at the ―Communicating European Citizenship‖ organised by 
UACES in London in March 2010 and at the ―The European Citizens‘ Initiative – a first assessment‖ seminar 
organised by the College of Europe in Bruges in January 2011. 
Anticipating the Attitudes of European Civil Society Organisations to the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI): Which Public Sphere may it Promote? 
 
by Louis Bouza Garcia 
 
The history of the ECI: two paradoxes  
This paper takes the recent regulation on the European Citizens‘ Initiative (ECI) as an 
opportunity to apply some insights from recent literature on the evaluation of participatory 
democracy
1
 to the European Union. In this sense, the paper evaluates the ECI‘s possible 
impact on the EU‘s participatory model and considers that it may become particularly 
important in terms of inclusion and enlargement of the European public sphere. The ECI is 
not the first experience of the EU with participatory democracy. Since the White Paper on 
European Governance
2
 the Commission considers its structured relations with civil society as 
a part of a new mode of governance that enhances the EU‘s legitimacy through the 
participation and empowerment of citizens‘ organisations. This paper considers some 
participatory democracy mechanisms such as regular consultation of civil society as a 
complement to representative democracy. The creation of a series of principles for the 
consultation of civil society organisations
3
 is a direct consequence of the 2001 White Paper on 
Governance. The ECI introduces an important change in the way in which civil society 
organisations, which are likely to become the main users of this mechanism, engage European 
institutions. It does not consist in associating organised civil society to the decision making 
                         
1
  Smith G., Democratic Innovations (Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press, 2009); Parés Marc (ed.), 
Participación y calidad democrática. Evaluando las nuevas formas de democracia participativa. (Barcelona: 
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  European Commission, White Paper on European Governance (Brussels: European Commission, 27 July 
2001), p. 16. 
3
  European Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and 
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission (European Commission, 11 
December 2002). 
24 
 
process but rather in giving an important agenda setting device to organisations able to 
mobilise 1 million citizens across Europe.  
There is an interesting paradox about the attitudes towards the ECI: although it is 
publicly praised as an important device for the democratisation of the EU, a number of 
influential actors are sceptical about its potential effects. Interviews carried out with a number 
of EU civil servants and civil society officials reveal that most members of the policy 
community that were influential in the inclusion of the article on the ECI into the European 
Constitution
4
 did not expect the ECI to have any meaningful impact on EU affairs. The 
second paradoxical datum that is important for the evaluation of the role of civil society 
within this mechanism is that, although it seeks to empower large numbers of citizens, the 
ECI was not the result of active mobilisation by millions of citizens but of efficient lobbying 
by citizens‘ organisations in the Convention on the future of Europe.  
Let it be clear from the beginning that this paper presents a series of hypotheses that 
will only be testable once the initiative is in force, although they are formulated on the 
grounds of the evaluation of current EU participatory mechanisms. Thus two preliminary 
criticisms may be expected based on two considerations. First, the ECI rests on a very weak 
conception of participatory democracy, since it is a very soft mechanism. Additionally the 
paper argues that the ECI it has little potential for bottom up deliberation or even top down 
communication. The paper argues that despite these objective shortcomings the initiative 
could nevertheless make a relevant contribution to the emergence of a European public 
sphere. 
There are at least two reasons why the political context is favourable to the strong 
development of the initiative. First, the European Citizens‘ Initiative is a further step in the 
EU‘s activism in countering charges of a democratic deficit by promoting a governance model 
                         
4
  Bouza Garcia Luis, ―From Civil Dialogue to Participatory Democracy: The Role of Civil Society 
Organisations in Shaping the Agenda in the Debates on the European Constitution‖, Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010, pp. 85-106. 
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comprising participatory and deliberative innovations complementing representative 
democracy. In this process participation by organised civil society has acquired a prominent 
place of honour.
5
 Consequently, EU institutions may be willing to turn the ECI into a 
significant participatory tool. Second, the possibility that the ECI empowers organised groups 
may well be one of its strengths. As a matter of fact, the general public‘s disinterest in EU 
matters is not shared by civil society organisations, which have increasingly invested 
attention, time and resources in order to follow and influence the EU policy making-process.
6
 
The ECI can thus rely on the existence of a constituency of civil society organised at EU level 
that may under adequate circumstances find an interest in using this participatory tool to 
increase their salience in the EU policy-making process. The paper focuses on the 
consequences that the ECI may have on the institutional and political life of the EU, in 
particular regarding the role of civil society, as a consequence of the specific goals of the 
main actors of the process. A sociological institutionalist approach is deemed particularly 
useful to do so because of the paper‘s focus on the social construction and effect of an 
institutional device such as the ECI, and its ability to foresee social action at the field level, in 
this case that of European organised civil society. 
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This paper first presents different perspectives taken by academic literature on the 
relationship between participatory mechanisms and the emergence of a European public 
sphere. It finds that while initially the ECI will do little to increase deliberation, in the long 
run it can contribute to increase the politicisation of the EU. Second, the paper discusses the 
circumstances and mechanisms under which the citizens‘ initiative could foster the creation of 
the public sphere. It points out that appropriate implementation of the regulation on the ECI 
could transform the attitude of the main public of the EU, organised civil society and 
movements, and unleash a competition for the usage of this mechanism. The final section of 
the paper reflects on the effects of this mechanism that can stimulate contention at the EU 
level and make uninterested or hostile citizens participate in the system.  
 
Which kind of public sphere may it foster? 
The relationship between political participation and the public sphere is worth exploring, as 
advocates of participation like Pateman or Barber
7
 consider that it entails positive 
consequences for society at large beyond the mere political system. In his argument for strong 
democracy, Benjamin Barber
8
 analyses the dialogic relationship between the citizen and his 
community. In Barber‘s approach, which resembles the Athenian isegoria, dialogue, or talk in 
his own terms, is the process by which citizens and community interests are dialogically and 
mutually elaborated rather than opposed such as in liberal conceptions. Among nine functions 
of political talk that Barber identifies (178-198), two appear particularly important when we 
consider the EU‘s participatory model contribution to the emergence of a European public 
sphere: agenda-setting extended by talk beyond elites, and community building as the creation 
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8
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27 
 
of common interests and goods. Other authors
9
 consider that participatory democracy may 
contribute to strengthening civic attitudes and civil society, as well as well as include 
excluded groups and bringing representatives closer to the people.
10
 All of these mechanisms 
may, in turn, contribute to strengthening the European public sphere.  
Some aspects of the European citizens‘ initiative fit into a model of strong democracy 
based on the public sphere
11
 because the success of signature collection campaigns‘ depends 
on the ability of the ECI promoters to construct and communicate effectively a cause 
appealing to citizens. In particular, the ECI fulfils some of Barber‘s expectations about the 
potential of participation for equal access to political argumentation. First, it is a decentralised 
device with the potential to empower political ―outsiders‖ in that it allows citizens to 
construct and promote autonomously a cause that is not or is inadequately represented by the 
existing means for democratic expression such as political parties or the media. Furthermore, 
unlike opinion polls, citizens‘ panels or deliberative polls, it is not a measurement of public 
opinion but the expression of the political determination of a significant, albeit a minority, 
number of citizens.  
In any case, this discussion has to be reframed in the context of the existing European 
public sphere. The interest of the general public and of mass media for the EU, and in general 
for European topics, is very low and limited to rare, ―spectacular‖ events. This leads some 
authors
12
 to discard any consideration of the European public sphere for as long as these 
actors (media and general public) ignore European topics. However, it is possible to find 
European communicative spaces dominated by different actors and to ask which role these 
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spaces play in the emergence of a European public sphere.
13
 This approach, thus, pays 
attention to the effect of the communication between European institutions, political leaders 
and specialists of EU matters, such as organised civil society, for the emergence of a 
European general public sphere. Following this approach, it is possible to distinguish three 
different models of the relationship between political participation, including the ECI, and the 
emergence of a European public sphere.  
Top down Europeanisation 
The first model corresponds to the EU institutions‘ expectations concerning 
participatory mechanisms: they conceive them as information and communication devices. 
The European Commission has elaborated a whole discourse about the involvement of civil 
society in the governance of the EU.
14
 Commission officials and academics share a vision that 
democracy at the EU level presents differences with national models and hence representative 
democracy in the EU is to be complemented with other, participatory or deliberative, models 
of democracy. Following the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005 the Commission tried to associate civil society consultation to the EU‘s 
communication policy.
15
 This strategy aims at ―communicating Europe in partnership‖16 and 
tries to get the general public interested in the fairly specialised consultations of civil society 
happening in Brussels.  
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The European Commission seems to extend this expectation to the ECI. In the 
explanatory memorandum of its proposal for a regulation on the citizens‘ initiative, the 
Commission considers that the ECI ―provides a singular opportunity to bring the Union closer 
to the citizens and to foster greater cross-border debate about EU policy issues, by bringing 
citizens from a range of countries together in supporting one specific issue‖.17 This 
expectation seems to imply that by signing petitions citizens will automatically be better 
informed on what the EU does and will become more knowledgeable of the EU. The ECI‘s 
contribution to vertical Europeanisation will, however, be minimal since it requires only a 
small measure of communication which is likely to happen in a ―vertical way‖, that is, 
appealing to a special section of citizens‘ interests (for instance environmental or health 
concerns) which is a type of communication likely to touch on already well informed 
citizens.
18
 
Thus this approach expects the ECI to be a way to foster deliberation and knowledge 
on EU affairs. Despite the abovementioned potential of the ECI to link directly the public and 
EU decision making, citizen initiatives do not fit well in a deliberative model because 
signature collection does not provide evidence about the usage of argument or the 
transformation of the points of view of the contenders. In this sense, they rather constitute a 
political participation and interest aggregation mechanism. Regarding knowledge, there is 
little evidence to support the hypothesis that citizens will become better informed on the EU 
by merely signing an ECI. In fact, the campaigns are unlikely to address citizens concerned 
with European matters, but rather citizens concerned by a specific cause or problem that must 
be addressed at European level. Additionally, the extent to which signatories will follow the 
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issue after they endorse a specific initiative will depend on the promoters to keep them 
informed. 
However, this paper‘s argument is that this tool can strongly contribute to deliberation 
on the European Union beyond the extremely specialised circles
19
 or very vague ones in terms 
of political will formation
20
where the literature has usually placed deliberation on EU affairs. 
It would do so by providing the conditions for the emergence of debates about European 
affairs and lifting the entrenched resistances of political parties or the media.
21
 It is in this 
sense that the citizens‘ initiative could be a significant trigger for a functional reflexive 
democratisation process,
22
 because it would create the initial conditions for a demand of 
further democratisation. Building on Eder and Trenz‘s more sophisticated conception, the 
general argument would be that the ECI could attract the attention of the media and foster 
greater debates attracting citizens‘ attention. 
However it is unlikely that the mere usage of the ECI will enlarge the debates on the 
EU. First, this mechanism seems to rely on imitation, implying that the more the ECI would 
be used, the more it will attract other initiatives. In this sense, this does not substantially 
change the media approach to the EU, since previous democratic changes (direct election of 
the EP, increase of co-decision procedure between the European Parliament and the Council 
or the deliberation of the European Convention) did not spark a substantial, let alone 
sustained, attention of the media for the EU. This is confirmed by the fact that none of the 
numerous European signature collection campaigns initiated since the Convention‘s decision 
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to propose the admission of a European citizens‘ initiative, in 2003,23 has attracted significant 
media attention. 
Second, the ability of the ECI to attract the media attention will not depend on the 
mechanism itself but on the subject matter addressed by the ECI. In this sense the media are 
likely to pay more attention to ―exotic‖ initiatives which are unlikely to be taken on board by 
the Commission, either because they are opposed to its own agenda, e.g. eurosceptic ones, or 
simply because they are beyond its own mandate. A good example may be the popular 
question of the European Parliament seat, on which the Commission has no competence to act 
or to initiate any change. Additionally, failed initiatives, particularly if they touch upon 
controversial issues, will receive much more attention. In this model the contribution of the 
ECI to the attention of the media may be limited or rather counterproductive from the EU 
institutions point of view. 
Democratisation as a result of competition 
An alternative approach to the citizens‘ initiative‘s influence on the emergence of a 
European public space puts the focus on indirect citizens‘ mobilization by organisations 
trying to influence EU politics. This model does more justice to the abovementioned reflexive 
democratisation argument, by focusing not on an automatic spillover from the EU institutions 
to the general publics, but on induced spillover by political actors. In this model, the 
generalisation of the debate on the EU is not the result of the EU institutions or other political 
actors‘ activism, but of the basic mechanisms of a political system and a public space: 
competition between these actors for attention or political resources. It thus focuses on one of 
the EU‘s key publics: organised groups and specialists.  
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The ECI is considered here as a political tool likely to be used by these actors 
inasmuch as it provides them with access to the EU political system. From a formal point of 
view the European Citizens‘ Initiative is a weak device as it does not impose strong legal 
obligations to act upon the institutions.
24
 From an institutional perspective however, it is 
relevant since it endorses officially a form of collective action. Such endorsement may turn 
the ability to design and carry out pan-European campaigns mobilising public opinion at the 
national level into a more influential form of collective action in the EU. 
The literature has repeatedly pointed out that civil society organisations tend to use 
insider access collective action registers when addressing EU institutions
25
 and that the 
grassroots level is often not associated by the European level organisations when engaging in 
policy discussions at EU level.
26
 If the capacity to organise signature collection campaigns 
and to mobilise citizens becomes a more valuable strategy, the Citizens‘ Initiative may 
unleash a competition between different organisations that so far used insider access 
strategies. Thus it may, potentially, restructure the relations among these actors and between 
them and the institutions, by creating a cleavage between those able and willing to use the 
new tool and those attached to older forms of collective action. 
In such a scheme, general public deliberation on the EU would acquire an increased 
political relevance, as it would be closely associated to the competitive dynamics in the EU 
public sphere, which is far from being the case up to now: civil society organisations take part 
in deliberative discussion fora, but the dynamics active in these specialised public spaces do 
not provide room for the general public. Thus, it appears that the competition between 
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organisations using different collective action registers for the attention of the institutions may 
have a potential for the politicisation of debates and discussion on the EU that has been 
identified as a need for the emergence of a democratic public sphere.
27
 
This approach endorses potential criticisms that the ECI does not empower citizens, 
but well-organised and resourceful groups. The argument is that the ECI is not easy to launch 
by ordinary citizens and requires a degree of political organisation and expertise that is only 
available to organisations. However, it is difficult not to see that as a democratic progress. 
Firstly, it empowers civil society organisations by providing them an institutionalised way to 
introduce proposals. And secondly, as the next section will argue, it provides them with a 
strong motivation to engage directly with their grassroots members and citizens in general on 
EU topics. Since most of these organisations tend to prefer insider access‘ strategies this is 
with no doubt a major progress. That said, organisations will only use this mechanism if it is 
likely to be successful and if the costs are likely to be inferior to the returns. The following 
section examines how EU institutions may act on both aspects. 
 
Under which conditions will civil society use the ECI? 
The ECI may make an important contribution to the enlargement of the European public 
sphere if its currently most active publics, mainly civil society organisations active at the EU 
level, use it regularly. However, two obstacles to the generalisation of the usage of ECIs by 
civil society seem to emerge. First, the regulatory and practical difficulties of organising 
European initiatives are addressed. Second, the attitudes of EU level civil society organisation 
towards the initiative are considered, in particular by comparing them to their participation via 
other tools such as civil dialogue 
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Institutional difficulties: a relatively favourable regulatory environment 
At first sight the European Citizens‘ Initiative is rather generous: compared to similar 
schemes used at national level,
28
 the threshold of required signatories is rather low since one 
million citizens represent only 0.2 % of the total population of the EU. 
However this does not mean that it will be easy to gather signatures. The weakness of 
the general European public being the main challenge, the regulatory framework of the 
initiative is decisive for a successful instrument. Although observers of the early stages of the 
institutional debate on the regulation
29
 have pointed out that the regulation proposed by the 
Commission established major hurdles for the initiative, it appears that the finally adopted 
Regulation makes the ECI much easier to implement as a result of the intervention of the 
European Parliament. The design of the instrument, which is covered elsewhere in this 
issue,
30
 is a decisive factor in the decision of civil society to use the ECI to try to influence 
EU politics: this is only likely to happen if the benefits in terms of influence outnumber the 
costs of organising an ECI. The main cost consists in gathering one million signatures in at 
least a quarter of the member states. The best example of the difficulty for organisations to 
gather this number of signatures is the failure of the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), which represents sixty millions workers across Europe, to reach this number in its 
campaign to defend public services.
31
 This cost is significantly increased by the uncertainty 
linked with the admissibility of the initiatives, and partly waived by some of the ECI 
regulation provisions. By contrast, the benefit offered to the supporters appears small by 
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comparison to existing mechanisms, unless the Commission‘s political stance shifts the 
relative cost of these mechanisms. 
Second to gathering one million signatures, the most relevant cost for the organisation 
of a European citizens‘ initiative is gathering the signatures in at least 7 member states (1/4 of 
the total), the Regulation‘s definition of the ―significant number of Member states‖ mentioned 
by the Treaty. Whereas the demand that ECIs represent genuinely European causes 
contributes to fostering the emergence of a public sphere, it is this very absence that makes it 
difficult to organise the initiatives. It would have been paradoxical to establish a demanding 
threshold (1/3 of Member states, such as in the Commission‘s initial proposal) for the sake of 
the creating more European causes, as undertaking an  would be extremely costly. In this 
sense, collecting signatures in 7 different countries implies costs like translation and 
organisation, including coping with the different provisions for verification of signatures, 
which are beyond the capacities of most organisations in Europe. 
These non-negligible costs are significantly increased by the effect of uncertainty as to 
the admissibility not only in political but legal grounds, as ECIs have to be presented on 
matters and issues on which the Commission can act. Although the Commission will discard 
initiatives manifestly beyond the scope of its powers, it will only proceed to a detailed 
analysis on the admissibility after signature collection has been completed. Whereas it seems 
unlikely, dismissing an initiative having 1 million signatures on formal grounds is a 
possibility that introduces uncertainty as to the effect of successful campaigns and increases 
the costs of using the ECI. 
Additionally, the regulation includes some dispositions that could be considered as 
―cost waivers‖, in that they facilitate the process. The most obvious one, which was present in 
the first version of the Commission‘s proposal, is the possibility to collect statements of 
support online. This is most likely to change the very conception of signature collection 
36 
 
campaigns: it can be expected that online campaigns relying on social media and viral 
diffusion will significantly reduce the time and effort needed to collect the signatures. The 
second one is the requirement to set up an organisation committee, which is a formal 
recognition of the promoters of the initiative. Although this recognition is a soft one when 
compared to several national frameworks because there are no provisions about cost 
reimbursement lest the possibility to withdraw the initiative,
32
 the possibility for a group of 
citizens to be involved at some point of the decision making process by formally presenting 
the initiative to the institutions is a significant novelty for the EU political system. 
It thus appears that despite imposing some non-negligible costs, an effort was made to 
make the Regulation relatively user-friendly by including as well some significant innovations 
to waive these costs. The next section suggests however that some of the more relevant 
difficulties and opportunities lay beyond the formal question and are embedded in the nature 
of the EU political system and its weak general public sphere.  
Furthermore, the regulation has not addressed a procedural question which may be 
politically sensitive, which is the confluence of similar or totally opposite initiatives.
33
 
Although this eventuality has been regulated in some national legislation in order to avoid a 
sort of inflation of initiatives over topics already addressed and that initiatives are coherent, 
the EU seems to have decided to deal with this issue as a political matter. However, this 
challenge may provide as well some opportunities for pan-European deliberation if it is not 
exclusively dealt by the Commission‘s discretional decision but by a procedure aiming to 
foster a debate among these conflicting proposals. A first obvious step would be to provide 
information to organisers of existing potentially conflicting proposals and possibly favour a 
public debate among those before or during the signature collection. A second idea may be to 
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delay presentation of any of these initiatives until the other has concluded its period of 
collection in order to contrast whether two conflicting proposals are really on the agenda. 
Should this finally occur, the Commission would have a very strong ground to elaborate its 
own proposal albeit letting the Committees of both proposals be heard before the Parliament. 
Although this may require some adjustments to the Regulation, it may foster a genuinely 
deliberative policy-making process.  
Political difficulties 
As it was pointed above, the inclusion of the ECI in the Treaty is the result of a 
lobbying campaign by civil society organisations.
34
 However the organisations that were the 
most influential in this achievement, IRI and Mehr Demokratie, are not regularly involved in 
the regular ―civil dialogue‖ that was shaped by civil society consultations by EU institutions 
between 1996 and 2003.
35
 On these grounds arises an unexpected political obstacle to the 
general usage of the ECI: the well-established European civil society organisations are 
unlikely to use the ECI because they have a preference for alternative participatory 
mechanisms. 
A sceptic attitude by established European civil society organisations 
When the forms of action and advocacy of civil society organisations active at EU 
level are considered, it appears that signature collection and initiatives are infrequent in 
contrast with a high degree of involvement into stable participatory systems. Whereas this 
obviously does not make these organisations unable to use the initiative, it casts a doubt about 
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these organisations willingness to use this tool,
36
 in particular if one compares it with the 
influence they can achieve via other less costly mechanisms. 
To start with, if one considers the twenty-two organisations that were most active in 
the abovementioned consultations on participatory democracy in the EU, only three of them 
asked the European Convention to include principles of direct democracy in the European 
Constitution. The aim of the majority of these organisations was to promote a system of 
institutionalised access of civil society organisations to the European institutions. Regarding 
the citizens‘ initiative, the position of these organisations could be summarised in the 
following extract from an interview with a member of the Social Platform, one of the leading 
organisations in the abovementioned group:  
―[…] we did not ask for the citizens‘ initiative, it was a very open process, 
and that came from other people. […] It was not our idea, but we were very 
happy that it was included […].‖37 
This quote is a good summary of the position of these organisations‘ towards the citizens‘ 
initiative: it is considered a positive evolution, but not as the main mechanism of the model of 
participatory democracy that they were promoting. 
Turning now to the reactions of these civil society organisations to the recent 
consultation on the Green Paper on the citizens‘ initiative,38 it is noticeable that only eight 
organisations out of the abovementioned twenty-two did actually contribute to this 
consultation. This confirms that the European Citizens‘ Initiative is far from being a priority 
for the organisations that were involved in the inclusion of civil dialogue in the Treaty article 
on participatory democracy. 
Qualitative analysis of these contributions shows a generally positive but distant 
attitude. Four of these contributions are very supportive of the ECI. However, another group 
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of four organisations wrote to ask the Commission to carry out action as well on other 
participatory tools. The following example from the Social Platform position paper stands out 
as a confirmation: 
―Social Platform welcomes the Green Paper on the citizens‘ initiative. As a 
response, Social Platform calls on the European Commission to launch a 
public consultation on how to implement the first part of the Lisbon Treaty 
article 11 on civil dialogue. […] This would ensure that both parts of the 
article are properly implemented. Social Platform would like to stress that 
the right to petition is not the only new instrument related to participatory 
democracy that the Treaty of Lisbon introduces into EU decision making 
processes.‖39 
It thus appears that there is little appropriation of the European Citizens‘ Initiative by the 
organisations, which had advocated for better access to EU institutions for organised 
European civil society. It can be argued that this attitude is connected to the modest place that 
the mobilisation of activists, supporters and grassroots members plays, in general, in the 
collective action register of these organisations. 
Powerful alternative tools 
The lack of connection between the demands of European-level civil society 
organisations and their grassroots members and their difficulty to mobilise them was clear as 
well during the European Convention, when civil society organisations obtained the inclusion 
of an article on participatory democracy in the Treaty: 
―And then we have the, […] CONCORDs and the Social Platforms, who in a 
way delude themselves about the way they are making impact. The 
Convention was where their credibility was smashed. It was smashed 
because they could not deliver, they made a lot of noise by saying: ‗Our 
members are not happy, our members would want this…‘, and they got a lot 
of what they asked for. And then when the politicians would come and say: 
‗And now your members will be happy and they will be supportive?‘ ‗Oh! 
There‘s no way we can contact them‘.‖40 
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Several reasons have been pointed out in the literature to explain this relative 
disconnection: the structural lack of staff,
41
 the preference for insider lobbying styles
42
 or to 
the structure of opportunities created by the institutional setup.
43
 In a sense, mobilising 
members at EU level is difficult per se and is not really a very valuable tool in interest 
representation in Brussels. Thus, some organisations have developed close ties with 
institutions based on an exchange of expertise, support and trust which have resulted in a very 
large independence from their principals. This results in EU-level civil society little interest in 
organising campaigns akin to citizens‘ initiatives. 
The reason for the creation of participatory mechanisms involving civil society 
organisations is that they are expected to be close to citizens and able to convey a two-way 
communication between them and the European institutions.
44
 Whereas the involvement of 
organised civil society in participatory mechanisms is obviously a democratic improvement, 
this contributes little to bringing the EU closer to citizens if organisations do not effectively 
bring citizens into the process. On the one hand, civil dialogue is an important contribution to 
better policy making and to EU institutions accountability, but it is a minor contribution to the 
EU public sphere. On the other hand, demonstrations and signatures collection are an 
important contribution to the public sphere, but are much more costly and less efficient for 
organisations than participation in institutionalised dialogue. 
It is thus clear that the question of the ECI efficiency and capacity to influence the EU 
decision making process depends of the capacity of its promoters to build up an influential 
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coalition able to put political pressure on the European institutions. In this sense, the ability to 
mobilise public opinion may become a relevant resource yet a rare one since many European 
organisations will have difficulties in doing so. 
 
Anticipating the effects of the ECI: competition and politicisation 
The analysis carried out so far suggests that the success of the European citizens‘ initiative 
would have the potential to contribute to the politicisation of EU affairs. One of the reasons is 
that it would grant a way of access to outsider organisations and causes that will introduce a 
controversial approach in a consensus-prone polity. The ECI may thus have a restructuring 
effect in the European as it may bring with it a whole set of new actors. To some extent this 
has been confirmed by the fact that the abovementioned consultation on the citizens‘ initiative 
had seen a number of new organisations participating and signing up to the register of interest 
representatives, starting with the organisations that promoted it in the Convention (‗Initiative 
and Referendum Institute‘ and ‗Mehr Demokratie’), which had not signed in to the register 
before. 
The importance of civil dialogue as the predominant mechanism for the relations 
between civil society and EU institutions tends to exclude less organised interests and more 
radical groups from EU politics. This is because influence in these fora is the consequence of 
repeated involvement, ability to engage with other organisations and civil servants and 
availability of expertise. By contrast, the ECI provides access to the organisations having 
alternative resources such as the ability to organise public-oriented campaigns. In this sense 
the ECI may be used by outsider organisations despite its weak legal rank, because this is 
already part of their collective action repertoire and because of the endorsement that the 
Treaty recognition implies. 
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Furthermore, the eventual emergence of a bigger weight de facto for the ECI would 
substantially increase the number of organisations willing to invest resources in ECIs.  In fact, 
collecting signatures to petition European Institutions is something citizens and organisations 
could already do by virtue of freedom of expression. Thus, if the ECI is really to provide any 
kind of new empowerment to its promoters and signatories, it can be argued from a normative 
point of view that the Commission should present all successful initiatives, even if they 
incompatible with its own agenda.
45
 On the one hand this would not change the Commission‘s 
formal right of initiative. On the other, it would grant that all the organisations able to conduct 
campaigns would have an opportunity to present their proposals to the decision making 
institutions. This is particularly important when it comes to eurosceptic initiatives, as their 
rejection without a debate would certainly deepen the EU‘s legitimacy crisis. Furthermore, 
this may contribute to turn the frequent opposition to the EU into an institutionalised 
opposition to the serving Commission policies. In turn, that would give the Commission and 
the public the opportunity to make the EU‘s decision-making institutions accountable. The 
Commission is often the victim of ―blame Brussels game‖. However, if it presented 
Eurosceptic initiatives to the European Parliament and the Council, this very fact could shed 
light over the democratic nature of the EU decision-making process as the proposals made by 
participatory mechanisms will finally be decided by representative democracy institutions 
such as the Parliament and the Council.  
This normative argument coincides as well with the foreseen attitude of the 
Commission. The Commission‘s expectation to obtain legitimacy from civil dialogue seem to 
have decreased, as it has not taken forward any action to modify the existing schemes and 
now seems to place bigger expectations on the ECI which allows a much larger citizens‘ 
participation. Creating such a de facto policy would thus contribute to increase both the 
                         
45
  Bouza Garcia, Democracia participativa, sociedad civil y espacio público en la Unión Europea, op. cit. 
43 
 
number and the diversity of the initiatives, providing an important push for the emergence of 
a European public sphere because it would make the ability to engage with the public one of 
the conditions of the success of European civil society organisations. A favourable attitude by 
the Commission to this public sphere enhancing mechanisms can be expected because the 
Commission has designed programmes with this purpose for years.  
The effect of such an evolution on the public sphere would be far from negligible. It 
would provide organised civil society with a stronger access to the policy agenda than it can 
be achieved by civil dialogue. In turn, it would give them a very strong motivation that does 
not exist now to inform, involve and mobilise their members and public opinion at large. In 
this sense, organisations that have traditionally been influential via insider tactics would have 
to compete with outsider organisations mobilising public opinion via the ECI, which would in 
turn give them a motivation to use it too and thus contribute to a generalisation of the ECI. 
This could be even strengthened if the ability to organise citizens‘ initiatives was to be taken 
into account as a way to measure the representativeness of civil society organisations 
participating in civil dialogue.
46
 This proposal does not necessarily exclude advocacy 
organisations promoting a cause instead of their members, since advocacy organisations may 
very well carry out signature collection beyond their own members.  Exceptions may 
nevertheless be formulated for organisations advocating minority interests or causes. An 
increased usage of outsider repertoires relying on public opinion mobilisation such as 
signature collection may bring some elements of a protest regime to the EU
47
 into 
Commission – civil society relations making them less expertise-oriented and consensus-
prone. However a radical transformation of the EU system is unlikely because the very logic 
of competition can conduct organisations seeking influence to suggest initiatives that can be 
endorsed by the European institutions. 
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The question about the EU‘s politicisation is controversial because it deals directly 
with the transformation of the public‘s attitudes towards the EU. It challenges the first 
approach outlined in section 2, which assumes that the citizens just need more knowledge to 
appreciate the EU. On the contrary, it fully assumes the political nature of the EU as a mature 
structure where the issue at stake is no longer the polity building but its policies. Such an 
approach transforms the understanding of contestation as no longer a challenge to European 
integration but as a routine phenomenon of political competition over it. Whereas this is 
obviously far from being the general rule, it may well be a relevant new development for 
some political actors
48
 and countries.
49
. 
It seems that the ECI may be a bigger novelty than generally expected, as it may place 
the Commission but also European institutions in general in the relatively new situation of 
managing agendas and proposals coming from outsider organisations. In this sense, the 
crucial issue in the future of the ECI will be the attitude that the Commission will adopt 
towards it. It may on the one hand choose to accept proposals advancing its own agenda and 
dismiss all the others. Whereas this will certainly be fully legitimate, it will miss the 
opportunity to turn contestation into the political system and to normalise it. 
It has been argued that granting every proposal reaching one million signatures the 
possibility to be discussed by the institutions may unleash a politicisation of the relations 
between the EU institutions and organised civil society.  This would happen in a sort of cycle, 
as the ECI would certainly turn this tool into the most powerful influence device available to 
organisations as it would ensure a proposal‘s inclusion in the decision-making mechanism, 
which would provide a strong motivation for organisations to turn from low to high saliency 
lobbying repertoires. Whereas a measure of radicalisation is expected, and will also contribute 
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to the end of constructing a public sphere, it is most likely that organisations seeking 
influence rather than just fame will make proposals that are acceptable to EU institutions, 
which would contribute to moderate some of the degree of contestation towards the polity by 
institutionalising opposition. In the medium-term, the conditions for success in term of 
becoming actual legislation will require the construction of relevant political coalitions, and 
possibly reaching far more than the minimum requisites of a million signatures in 7 countries. 
However, the basic point is that the role of the gatekeeper is essential if such circle is to be 
unleashed. Otherwise the cost of using the ECI may outnumber its predictable benefits and 
discourage most organisations from doing so. 
 
Conclusion 
Having analysed the effect that the ECI may have on the role of European civil society 
organisations in the public sphere, the conclusion is that despite its weak legal and 
institutional profile, the citizens‘ initiative can play an important role in shaping a more public 
oriented role for European organised civil society. The paper has aimed at providing a series 
of plausible hypotheses on how organised civil society may use the ECI, building on available 
data and assessments of their collective action repertoires. That said, it is clear that these 
hypotheses will only be testable once the ECI becomes usable in mid-2012. 
Following an institutionalist approach, the focus has been put on the political 
significance of the ECI. The ECI is rooted in the European Convention and on the preceding 
debate concerning European governance. The Commission has maintained this approach to 
the European democratic deficit debate in the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty and in the debate about the Lisbon Treaty. In this sense, the paper considers that the 
ECI is coherent with a decade-long policy by the Commission, making this institution friendly 
towards the mechanism. The paper has found  the existence of a non-negligible cleavage 
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between civil society groups that are well-organised and represented in the EU consultative 
mechanisms and other outsider organisations that may start using the citizens‘ initiative. In 
this sense, it is expected that there will be a measure of competition for the EU institutions‘ 
attention among EU level civil society groups involved in civil dialogue and those using the 
initiative, with the possibility that the usage of the ECI could spill over from outsider to better 
established organisations.  
Of course this possible effect is conditional on the initiative‘s efficacy and efficiency, 
that is, when the benefits it provides outweigh its costs. It has been pointed out that organising 
successful signature collection campaigns is a target beyond the capacities of many European 
organisations, despite the low signature threshold and the possibility to collect them on the 
Internet. In this sense, civil society organisations will only invest resources in this tool if they 
consider that a relevant objective can be achieved. If the Commission does not develop a 
supportive attitude to the ECIs, facilitating their arrival into the legislative agenda, the result 
may be that organisations wanting to influence EU policy making will ignore the ECI, leaving 
it to organisations willing to show that the EU does not listen to its citizens. 
This paper‘s conclusions rely strongly on the expectation that the Commission will 
prove a commitment to participatory democracy. The Commission could do that by 
developing a policy extending the ECI beyond its present boundaries. The first one would be 
to accept all successful initiatives. This would have the advantage of enlarging the EU‘s 
public sphere by providing attention to groups that do not share the Commission‘s agenda. 
Whereas some radicalisation of EU politics cannot be excluded, it will certainly be limited to 
organisations seeking to build a name because initiatives contrary to EU values will be 
discarded at the registration and because organising an ECI is too costly for organisations to 
systematically present unacceptable proposals. Additionally the Commission could, at least in 
the early life of the initiative, develop a policy of active support for the initiative. 
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The ECI may prove to be a bigger innovation than it is expected by some of the actors of the 
civil society field as it changes the agenda setting dynamics. Until now, the access to the 
agenda was limited to organisations sharing the EU‘s general orientation. Although the ECI 
does not necessarily change this, it is expected that the political pressure on EU institutions to 
admit alternative conceptions of the EU or simply alternative policy agendas will be much 
higher with the initiative. This will certainly have the effect of making EU politics more 
contested and less prone to consensus, concentrating contention on EU policies rather than on 
the polity.   
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Introduction 
Democracy is one of the founding principles of the European Union. According to Article 
10(1) and Article 10(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), ―the functioning of the 
Union shall be founded on representative democracy‖, ―citizens are directly represented at 
Union level in the European Parliament‖ that they elect directly since 1979, and ―Member 
States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in 
the Council by their governments‖. Hence, the European political arrangement is a complex 
system of representation combining two different procedures of legitimisation: direct and 
indirect.
1
  
Representative democracy can be conceptualised in many possible ways, as the 
flourishing field of democratic theory demonstrates. Voting constitutes the cornerstone of 
representative democracy; it is a central instance of formal political participation of citizens. 
While voting can be understood as a preference-aggregation mechanism, a mechanism to 
exercise control over officials or a procedure revealing the general will, it is necessary for the 
maintenance and meaningfulness of the system. 
Yet, in established democracies, over the last couple of decades, there has been a 
steady trend of decreasing voter turnout. While lower turnout could be a sign of contentment 
of voters with the system, the literature rather associates it with a growing disinterest in 
                         
1
  Mangiameli Stelio, ―The role of the European Parliament and the principle of representative democracy‖, 
http://www.europeanpubliclaw.eu/paper/169-stelio-mangiameli-the-role-of-the-european-parliament-and-the-
principle-of-representative-democracy.html#_ftn2 (accessed online on 15 July 2011).  
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politics and decreasing trust in politicians,
2
 as far as other options of formal political 
participation (membership in trade unions or in political parties) or civic participation
3
 also 
decline. However, as explained by Pippa Norris, the newer, informal ―channels of civic 
engagement, mobilisation and expression‖ such as NGO participation, protest or consumer 
movements are on the increase.
4
 
The trend of declining formal participation is not new to the European Union. Since 
the first direct elections of the European Parliament which took place in 1979, every 
following voters‘ turnout has been lower, to pass from 62% to 43% in only 30 years‘ time.5 
While the powers of the European Parliament grow with consequent treaty changes, one could 
expect citizens to be more interested in voting and selecting their representatives. In spite of 
that, the turnout progressively declines and the discourse about ‗democratic deficit‘ flourishes, 
too.  
This last concept, coined in 1979 by David Marquand
6
, implies that at the Union level, 
citizens lack proper representation, and that European institutions are not sufficiently 
accountable before national publics. However, Yves Mény reminds that ―the debate has raged 
about the extent and content of this deficit‖7 or even about its very existence.8 Without aiming 
at resolving this debate about the democratic deficit/legitimacy crisis/credibility crisis in the 
EU, it is necessary to look into possible remedies to it.  
                         
2
  Zittel Thomas and Fuchs Dieter, Participatory democracy and political participation. Can participatory 
engineering bring citizens back in? (Routledge: London, 2007), p. 1.  
3
  Putnam Robert D., ―Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America‖, in: 
Niemi Richard G. and Weisberg Herbert F. (eds.), Controversies in Voting Behavior (CQ Press, 2001), p. 40.  
4
  Norris Pippa, Democratic Phoenix: reinventing political activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 4.  
5
  Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/turnout_en.html. (Accessed 
online on 16 July 2011) The decline of voters‘ turnout was gradual over time, so it would be impossible, for 
instance, to attribute the responsibility for it to newer member states who integrated in 2004 and where, on 
the whole, voters‘ turnout is lower than in Western European countries. The percentage of voters‘ turnout in 
the European Parliament elections is quasi a mirror illustration of French, German or Dutch turnouts, for that 
matter.  
6
  Marquand David, Parliament for Europe (J. Cape, 1979), p. 64.  
7
  Mény Yves, ―De la démocratie en Europe: old concepts and new challenges‖, Journal of common Market 
Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1-13. 
8
  For different definitions of ‗democratic deficit‘ and divergent stances on its existence see e.g. Majone G., 
1993, 2000; Hix S. and Follesdal A., 2002, Schmitter P., 2004 or Levinson S., 2006.  
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At the European level, the need to bring more citizen participation and support for the 
institutional and political system is put forward. This focus is not  specific to the European 
level, it can also be found at the national level, where governments try to overcome the 
aforementioned decrease in formal political participation. T. Zittel calls it by the name of 
‗participatory engineering‘ that implies ―purposive attempts on the part of political elites to 
affect political participation via the reform of the institutions of democracy‖.9 
Indeed, the attempt to amend the institutions of democracy occurred at the EU level. 
Seemingly, the solution of promoting more participatory democracy, as a complement to the 
existing representative system, was chosen. This commitment was embodied by introducing 
into the Treaty the provision promoting the development of more citizen participation (Article 
11 TEU). This is where our attention is pointed in the direction of the European Citizens‘ 
Initiative (ECI), resulting from Article 11(4) TEU. 
The object of this paper is to analyse the nature and formal requirements of the ECI, 
which allows one million European citizens from a significant number of Member States to 
invite the European Commission to present a piece of legislation
10
 on a specific issue for 
further consideration of the two main branches of the Union legislators: the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The ECI can be seen as closer to informal rather than 
to formal instruments of political participation, foreseen as complementary to the existing 
formal participatory mechanisms, pillars of the representative democracy. 
The question is whether this new mechanism, which will be used as of April 2012, 
will succeed in reducing citizens‘ negative perception of distance from the European 
institutions.  
                         
9
  Op. cit. 7. 
10
  However, the ECI does not undermine the principle of representative democracy and does not destitute the 
European Commission from its monopoly of legislative initiative. Auer Andreas, ―European citizens‘ 
Initiative‖, European Constitutional Law Review, 2005, 1, p. 80. 
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At present, it seems that while the ECI could promote more popular participation in 
decision-making, by giving the European citizens an indirect
11
 (or at least political)
12
 right of 
initiative, it could indeed turn to be, with time, an enhancement of participatory democracy at 
the European level.  
The remainder of the paper will present the genesis of ECI and will discuss a number 
of controversial issues that arose during the process of fleshing out its form (section 2). Then, 
the legal nature of ECI will be discussed (section 3). Finally, the concluding remarks will 
elaborate on the ECI‘s possible contribution to the political system of the European Union, 
and the ways in which its use could remedy the democratic deficit and affect the concerned 
institutions, the European Commission, in particular (section 4).  
 
The genesis of the ECI 
The idea of establishing the ECI predates the Lisbon Treaty.  At first, it was the idea of 
introducing a right of petition to the European Parliament that was discussed in the context of 
the IGC in the lead-up to the Amsterdam Treaty. Subsequently, more open debate on the 
subject was launched in the framework of the Convention on the future of Europe. As a result 
of the effective lobbying by the Initiative and Referendum Institute (IRI) and by two members 
of the Convention (Jürgen Meyer and Alain Lamassoure), the Draft Constitutional Treaty 
contained a new Article 46, referring for the first time to the principle of participatory 
democracy in the EU and introducing the European Citizens‘ Initiative – the first transnational 
instrument of participatory democracy.   
While the explicit mention of the principle of participatory democracy itself did not 
outlive the rejection of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, the paragraph on the ECI was 
                         
11
  Response by Mehr Demokratie e.V. on the EU Commission‘s Green Book on the European Citizens‘ 
Initiative, 19.01.2010.  
12
  Kaczynski Piotr Maciej, ―The European Citizens‘ Initiative: A Proper Response from the Commission‖, 
CEPS, 08.01.2010, available at www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/2841  
56 
 
preserved. The most relevant articles introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in terms of establishing 
the relationship between the principle of representative democracy and the principle of 
participatory democracy are Articles 10 and 11 TEU-L. Article 10 TEU-L, which mirrors 
Article 45 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, confirms that the principle of representative 
democracy remains the founding principle of the Union. Article 10(3) TEU-L establishes a 
link between this principle and the right of citizens to participate in the democratic life of the 
Union. This provision should be read in conjunction with the provisions on the right to vote 
and the eligibility of EU citizens in EP elections, the right to address a petition to the EP, and 
the right to contact the European Ombudsman. The new Article 11 TEU-L, while no longer 
entitled ‗principle of participatory democracy‘, demonstrates the desire to bring the Union 
closer to its citizens, in the same manner as article 46 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. In its 
initial paragraphs, the article refers to the importance of maintaining a regular dialogue with 
civil society (more akin to ideas coming from the deliberative theory of democracy). Article 
11(4) TEU-L provides that at least 1 million EU citizens, nationals of a significant number of 
Member States, may invite the European Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on 
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties and where such an act falls in the framework of the Commission‘s 
powers. The modalities for implementation of the citizens‘ initiative were to be fixed in a 
regulation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Concerning the implementation of Article 11(4) TEU-L, a period of consultation took 
place between November 2009 and January 2010, allowing for the involvement of a broad 
range of actors.
13
 As expected, emphasis was placed on the need to ensure that the procedures 
and conditions remain simple, user-friendly and accessible, as well as proportionate to the 
(restrictive) nature of the instrument.  Following the consultation, the Commission presented a 
                         
13
  Specifically, 329 replies were received from stakeholders, individual citizens, organisations and public 
authorities. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2010:0370:FIN:EN:PDF 
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proposal for a regulation in March 2010.  It maintained some thresholds at a rather high level, 
i.e. the admissibility check was supposed to be performed only after the collection of 300,000 
signatures.  
Once the European Commission presented the draft proposal of a regulation, the 
Council agreed on the proposed draft on June 14, 2010. It did insist, however, on the 
introduction of a number of changes.  In particular, it considered that the Commission had to 
take a decision on admissibility as early as upon collection of 100,000 signatures from at least 
3 Member States. The admissibility criteria have remained the same apart from one additional 
clarification that the Council insisted upon.  An initiative would not be registered if contrary 
to the values of the Union, as listed in Article 2 TEU.
14
 In this way, no flexibility is left to the 
Commission to go beyond the values listed in the Treaty when assessing the validity of an 
initiative.  Furthermore, the Council insisted upon the insertion of an obligation on organisers 
to submit information on funding when submitting an initiative. Finally, it tasks the 
Commission with the preparation of a report on the implementation of the regulation 3 years 
after its entry into force.    
Parallel to the consideration by the Council, the European Parliament also started to 
work on this dossier. According to the legislative procedure, the appropriate committees in 
which rapporteurs have been appointed started reviewing the project. On 3 May 2010, two 
rapporteurs from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) were appointed (Alain 
Lamassoure, EPP, and Zita Gurmai, S&D), and on 1 June 2010, they were joined by two more 
rapporteurs from the Committee on Petitions (PETI, Diana Wallis, ALDE, and Gerald Häfner, 
Greens). These appointments were followed by the drafting of working documents by both 
pairs of rapporteurs, as well as by the organization of a number of seminars or public hearings 
organised by almost all political groups in the European Parliament. According to rapporteurs 
                         
14
  Article 2 TEU refers to respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
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of the Committee on Petitions, G. Häfner and D. Wallis, ―never has there been such 
widespread and open debate about a Draft Regulation in the history of the Parliament's 
activities‖.15 It is interesting to note that it was the first time ever for the Committee on 
Petitions to be directly involved in legislative activity. It was invited to provide its 
―knowledge and expertise in relation to the rights of citizens as expressed through the right of 
petition with which the 'Citizens' initiative' has much in common‖.16  
In total, in 2010, the Committee on Petitions discussed the ECI on six occasions (27 
January, 29 September, 25 October, 9 and 22 November, 1 December) and the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs, which was the leading committee on ECI, discussed different aspects 
of the Commission‘s draft on seven occasions: 19 April, 12 July, 30 September and 4/5 
October, 8 and 29 November and finally 13 December. The aforementioned hearings in the 
European Parliament included representatives of national parliaments (joint AFCO-PETI 
meeting on 4 October), the same as experts who had contributed to the idea and introduction 
of Article 11.4 in the Lisbon Treaty.  
A number of points proposed by the Commission were objected and discussed.  The 
overall concern was to amend the proposed draft so as to make it as user-friendly as possible.  
According to Jürgen Meyer, participating in the AFCO hearing on 5 October, there was an 
urgent need to remove what he considered to be the bureaucratic burden and red tape that 
started to accumulate around the proposal. For example, he pointed out that the new 
instrument was not binding in the first place for the Commission.  Hence, the ECI needs to be 
as simple and usable a procedure as possible, according to Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (also in 
the hearing on 5 October).  
                         
15
 ―Opinion of the Committee on Petitions for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the citizens‘ initiative‖, 23 November 2010. 
Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/organes/peti/peti_20101201_1500.htm, 
consulted online on 22 January 2010.  
16
  Idem.  
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A number of questions kept coming back in the discussion.  On the more technical 
side, one of the more prominent points was the admissibility check: the MEPs wondered not 
only who should realise it (the European Commission or the Petitions Committee, for 
instance), but also when to do it. The shared opinion among the speakers was that doing an 
admissibility check after collecting 300,000 (or even 100,000) signatures would be too late, 
and could discourage people from investing their effort into the procedure. A suggestion was 
presented to perform the admissibility check either at the registration of initiatives or, at the 
latest, after having collected 5,000 to 10,000 signatures. Another important question was the 
number of countries from which the signatures must originate: there was a broad agreement 
among the members of the AFCO Committee that 1/3 of Members States would be too big of 
a hurdle. Often ¼ was suggested, 1/5 (especially in the Committee on Petitions) or even less, 
4 or 5 states (S. Kaufmann). The time span of twelve months for collecting the signatures 
after the registration of an initiative seemed too short, and it was suggested to replace it with 
18 months. This proposition was formulated in light of previous experience of collecting 
signatures Europe-wide, that due to organizational complexity it took more than a year to 
gather a million of signatures. Some MEPs also objected the necessity of presenting an ID 
card/number while signing an ECI that proved controversial for civil society organizations.
17
  
They objected to it as being too intrusive, and unnecessary for the check of signature that 
would entail the name, surname, date of birth, address and signature. Yet another point of 
discord was the required age to sign an ECI: while members of AFCO seemed to agree with 
the Commission proposal of the age enabling one to vote in the European elections, members 
of PETI seemed to be willing to go one step further and allow those 16 years of age to sign an 
                         
17
  Carsten Borg from ECI Campaign stated, for instance, that the requirement of providing ID number from 
signatories would effectively render the ECI unusable, because people would not approve of collecting such 
sensitive information about themselves. This was also the opinion of Tony Venables from ECAS. Sources, 
respectively: Initiative for European Citizens‘ Initiative, at http://www.citizens-initiative.eu/?p=181 and 
EUobserver, ―EU democracy instrument continues to cause headaches‖, 23 June 2010, available at 
http://euobserver.com/9/30350 (consulted online on January 21, 2010).  
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ECI.  To their mind, such an option could contribute to generating more and better-informed 
debates about European issues from an early age.  
When it comes to more political issues, the most important one concerned the follow 
up of a successful ECI. In other words, what would happen if 1,000,000 signatures were 
collected within 12 months in ¼ of the Member States and an initiative fulfilled all formal 
requirements?  The opinion shared by members of AFCO Committee was that in such 
circumstances the organisers of such an initiative should at least be granted a public hearing in 
front of the Commission. The Commission should be bound to inform the organisers of an 
ECI of what would happen to their proposal. Of course, if it were accepted by the 
Commission and gave grounds to a new legislative proposal, then there would be no major 
problem.  The problem might rather emerge in the situation where the Commission decided 
not to follow-up the proposal that gathered 1,000,000 signatures. The MEPs even suggested 
defining the grounds on which the Commission might reject an ECI.  Some suggested that the 
EP should get the right to pressure the Commission to follow up on proposals; or at least, the 
citizens should have the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice against a refusal of 
the Commission to follow-up a successful initiative.  Yet another concern that was voiced, but 
not clearly addressed by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, was how to prevent the 
process from being hijacked by interest groups that would amount to an abuse of the ECI 
procedure. Yet another limitation of the ECI that was discussed was its material boundaries. 
Liberal MEP Andrew Duff, among others, objected to the fact that citizens would fall short of 
the opportunity of proposing ECIs that would promote treaty revisions and they would have to 
focus merely on application of the treaties.   
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It is important to bear in mind that throughout that period the institutional trialogue 
led
18
 the debate: the European Commission, Council and Parliament (with its final position set 
out in the amended draft regulation voted by AFCO on November 29 that excluded some of 
the most audacious propositions of PETI, such as to allow all EU legal residents, and not only 
citizens, from the age of 16 to sign ECIs) were trying to reach a compromise solution, in order 
to keep up to the initial schedule of having the plenary vote on the draft regulation before the 
end of 2010. There have been quite a few problematic issues: while the European Parliament 
was against the ID requirement, many Member States found it important for the process of 
checking the signatures. Second, the idea of lowering the age of signature of ECIs below the 
voting age in the European elections did not meet the Council‘s agreement. Third (and what 
took the most time in the negotiations), the question of what would be a significant number of 
Member State proved to be controversial. While the Parliament was arguing for 1/5, the 
Commission and the Council were upholding the initial proposal of 1/3. As to the timing of 
the admissibility check, the Parliament suggested the very beginning of the process, i.e. when 
a Committee of citizens is registering the procedure. The Commissioner for inter-institutional 
relations, Maros Sefcovic, seemed favourable to such a solution.  Yet another technical point 
of discord was when the regulation would come into force.  While the European Parliament 
wanted to give Member States 6 months for the implementation of the regulation, the 
Council‘s position was 12 months.  
While the hearings in the European Parliament were public, the inter-institutional 
negotiation was not. The representatives of civil society organizations were highly critical of 
the fact that the process of trialogue negotiation was held behind closed doors. Nevertheless, 
in the end, and with a considerable engagement of the Belgian Presidency during the 
                         
18
  The informal trialogues between institutions aim at finding compromise solutions on legislative projects that 
would be acceptable for the three institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council). Often times, the role of 
rotating Council presidency can be important in these trialogues, because the representative of the presidency 
identifies important discussion points, tries to reconcile possible divergent positions within the Council, and 
negotiates with the representatives of other institutions.  
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negotiations, the institutions came up with a compromise. In the words of Bruno Kaufmann, 
while ―the well-balanced registration procedure featuring a citizens' committee, the wide 
signature-gathering options, and also the encouraging hearing privileges for successful 
initiatives" have been maintained  
"some potentially lethal provisions have been preserved, such as the 
cumbersome ID requirements in some of the member states, the wide-
ranging financial transparency rules with their unclear sanctions, and the 
requirement to provide initiative texts in all the national languages where 
signatures will be gathered‖.19  
 
For other controversial points, the following solutions were retained: the signatures 
need to originate from at least ¼ of Member States; the admissibility check would be done 
already at the registration of an initiative; the age of vote was not lowered to 16 years, but 
upheld at the age allowing to vote in the European elections, the signatures will have to be 
collected during 12 months after the registration of an initiative by the Commission, and 
Member States were given 12 months for implementing provisions of the regulation.  
 
Implementation of the ECI 
Legal nature of the ECI 
As a preliminary remark, it would be useful to delineate the legal nature of the ECI by 
contrasting it with other instruments of participatory democracy intervening at the initiative 
stage of the elaboration of a legislative measure. Such an analysis would be useful in 
assessing the degree/extent of citizens‘ participation for which the initiative allows. The 
analysis will be based on one of the classifications constructed around three criteria: who is 
the author of the ballot proposal, who is the initiator of the procedure and who is the ultimate 
decision-maker as to the outcome of the procedure.
20
  
                         
19
 Kaufmann Bruno, ―Merry Christmas, Europe!‖, EUobserver, 12 December 2010, available at 
http://euobserver.com/18/31521 (consulted online on January 22, 2010).  
20
  Kaufmann Bruno, The European Citizens’ Initiative handbook: your guide to the world’s first transnational 
direct democratic tool (Brussels: Green European Foundation, 2010), p. 36. 
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The procedure, which allows for the greatest involvement of citizens in the legislative 
process, is the citizens‘ or popular initiative. It consists in establishing the right of a minority 
of citizens to propose to the general public the introduction of new law or a law modifying an 
existing legislative measure. The people, then, vote on the proposal in a referendum. 
Alternatively, the initiators of a proposal may also be enabled to withdraw it. So, the proposal 
emanates from the people and is decided upon by the people and, therefore, it gives the 
electorate agenda-setting power. The ECI resembles the popular initiative in that the initiator 
is a minority number of citizens. However, it is not for the European electorate to vote on the 
proposed initiative. The ECI is limited to the right to initiate and it is a competent authority, 
the Commission, which decides whether it should result in a fully-fledged legislative 
proposal. Further in the paper we will consider the extent to which the Commission may 
exercise discretion in this regard. This tool of direct democracy exists in Switzerland and in 
the US, where citizens can introduce an initiative with a subsequent vote without the need for 
approval by a representative authority.  
One variation of the popular initiative is the popular initiative with the possibility of 
authorities‘ counter-proposal. In this case, the procedure is again launched by a prescribed 
number of eligible voters, but the political authorities have the right to formulate a counter-
proposal in the framework of the process. The public then has to vote on both proposals 
simultaneously. The ECI does not include this very feature, but the institutions have the 
power to oppose an initiative through mechanisms inherent to the legislative procedure. As 
the Commission has the monopoly of legislative initiative, it may very well decide not to 
follow up on an initiated proposal, especially if its own policy agenda consists of measures 
going in a different direction. Alternatively, the Commission could, in the framework of the 
legislative process, propose different options and leave the choice of the best course of action 
to the Council and the Parliament. Then, concerning the Council and the Parliament, if they 
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wish to strike out an initiative that has made it to a draft proposal, they may very well do so at 
the adoption stage.  
The instrument that the ECI ascribes to is the agenda initiative/popular initiative 
proposal. The agenda initiative is the right of a specified number of eligible voters to propose 
the adoption of a law or measure to a competent authority. So, while the initiator is a group of 
citizens, the decision-maker is a representative authority. In the case of the ECI, this is the 
Commission. An agenda initiative can take different forms – it may take the form of an 
agenda initiative without popular vote, an agenda initiative followed by a public vote or a 
popular motion. The latter is a ―demand made, by a certain number of citizens, to Parliament 
asking it to enact some law or to take a decision within the range of its powers and 
competences‖.21 In the EU context, the ECI is an agenda initiative with a popular motion to 
the Commission, because it is the Commission and not the Parliament that holds the right of 
legislative initiative.   
Finally, the ECI needs to be distinguished from the existing right of EU citizens to 
address a petition to the EP.
22
 Under Article 227 TFEU, any citizen of the Union, as well as 
any person residing in any EU Member State, has the right to address a petition to the EP 
where it concerns a matter that comes within the EU‘s field of activity and affects them 
directly (entails a change in their legal position). In this context a petition can be individual or 
collective. Requirements such as a threshold consisting of a number of signatures do not apply 
to it, and the organ it is addressed to has no duty to fulfil or answer it. While the primary 
function of a petition is problem-solving, in certain cases the Committee on Petitions may 
refer a petition to other European Parliament committees for information or further action. As 
a consequence, a committee might take a petition into account in its legislative activities. Still, 
the ECI offers a much more extensive right of participation of citizens in the legislative 
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  Auer, op. cit. 
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  See articles 21 and 194 EC Treaty, currently, articles 24(2) and 227 TFEU. It is to be distinguished from the 
right of petition suggested at the Amsterdam IGC.  
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activity: in particular, it is submitted directly to the main body holding the right of legislative 
initiative.  
It is evident from this summary that it is the popular initiative that offers the most 
extensive rights of participation to citizens. The ECI does not go as far. It is an invitation to 
the Commission to introduce a legislative proposal, provided that certain conditions are 
satisfied, and thereby establishes a new constitutional competence for the citizens, adding an 
element of participatory democracy to the principle of representative democracy along which 
the Union‘s functioning is modeled. Despite its limitations, this new tool confers upon EU 
citizens powers of agenda-setting. It is a mixed form of participation as it combines features 
of direct democracy – as it is the citizens who set in motion the law-making procedure and 
spark an EU-wide debate – and indirect democracy – as the Commission maintains the 
ultimate initiative-making power.   
After this brief analysis of the legal nature of the ECI, we turn to a closer examination 
of the conditions for implementation of the ECI as defined in the Regulation on the citizens‘ 
initiative.
23
  
Requirements for a successful ECI 
It is necessary to distinguish between conditions which need to be fulfilled by 
organisers at the stage of registration of a proposed ECI, on the one hand, and requirements 
which need to be satisfied at the stage of final examination by the Commission of a 
successfully registered proposal. It is the former that will be the subject of this section. Under 
Article 4(2), registration will be refused by the Commission if any of the following conditions 
are not met:  
(a) the citizens’ committee has been formed and the contact persons have been designated;  
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  Regulation No. 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens‘ 
initiative, Official Journal of the European Union, L 65/1, 11.03.2011. 
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(b) the proposed citizens’ initiative does not manifestly fall outside the framework of the 
Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties;  
(c) the proposed citizens’ initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious; 
(d) the proposed citizens’ initiative is not manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set 
out in Article 2 TEU. 
The quantitative thresholds relating to the number of signatures required, as well as 
their territorial distribution, are necessary conditions for the examination by the Commission 
of the proposal.  
Who can introduce an ECI (personal element)? 
By virtue of Article 11(4) TEU-L, an ECI can be organised and endorsed by a specific body 
of natural persons: citizens of the Union and, therefore, nationals of a Member State. 
Therefore, third country nationals and legal persons are precluded from organising or signing 
an ECI. This is more restrictive than the personal scope of the right of petition, which extends 
to residents of a Member State. Interestingly enough, the Commission has adopted a different 
view as to the organisers of a citizens‘ initiative in the draft proposal, as it provided for the 
possibility for legal persons to prepare and submit an ECI to the Commission. Under Article 
2(3) of the Regulation on the citizens‘ initiative, the organisers can be only natural persons. 
Moreover, the organisers of an ECI must form a citizens' committee responsible for 
the preparation and submission of a citizens‘ initiative to the Commission.24 The committee 
should consist of at least 7 persons who are residents of at least 7 Member States and should 
include one representative and one substitute to perform a liaison function with the EU 
institutions. On the one hand, the rationale behind the adoption of this provision was to ensure 
that the organisers of an ECI speak with one voice. It appears somewhat restrictive and overly 
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formalistic to require of citizens to choose a particular structure for the initiation of an ECI 
rather than leave them the freedom to organise themselves in a different manner. While the 
provision may have been helpful as a non-binding recommendation to organisers, it seems 
overly burdensome and somewhat disproportionate as a compulsory condition sanctioned by 
refusal of registration according to Article 4(2)(a) of the Regulation. On the other hand, the 
committee would serve as a filter in contacts with the institutions. Most countries that have 
experience with initiatives require the establishment of such a committee as a precondition for 
registration (protects from ―spamming‖).25 While MEPs are allowed to support the 
organisation of an ECI, they may not be counted towards the members of a citizens‘ 
committee. This exclusion of MEPs from the citizens‘ committee could be explained by the 
desire to confer full ownership of the initiative on citizens. Indeed, the ECI should not 
represent an additional agenda-setting tool for the institutions. This would suggest that not 
only MEPs, but – by analogy – also the representatives of the other EU, and even national, 
institutions should not be counted as members of the citizens‘ committee.  
Subject-matter (content) 
The regulation spells out the limits to the material scope of an initiative, which 
condition registration. First, the initiative should not manifestly fall outside the scope of the 
Commission‘s power of legislative initiative under the Treaties. This means that the proposal 
should concern an area where the Union has competence to act. The type of competence – 
exclusive, shared, parallel or complementing – is not relevant as long as the Commission has 
a right of initiative in the area concerned. This would not be the case, for instance, of the 
CFSP. What if citizens were to invite the Commission to adopt an act which comes within the 
Commission‘s powers of execution? In principle, according to Article 291(1) TFEU, it is for 
the Member States to adopt measures implementing legally binding acts of the Union. If such 
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Opportunities for the European parliament‖, EUI paper, European Union Democracy Observatory, Florence, 
June 2010, p. 8. 
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measures need to be adopted at the Union level in order to ensure uniform implementation, 
the Commission is vested with implementing powers.
26
 So, whenever a legally binding act of 
the Union requires implementing measures and confers implementing powers on the 
Commission, an ECI could indeed aim at the adoption of such measures (comitology). 
Determining whether a subject falls in the scope of the Commission‘s powers to initiate 
legislation can be very difficult for laymen. One example of this is the ‗one seat‘ initiative, 
which made it clear that sometimes even MEPs are not fully clear about the delimitation of 
competences. Moreover, the term ‗manifestly‘ suggests that the decision as to the existence of 
competence is not a final one. Indeed, it appears that at the stage of registration there is an 
‗entire‘ but not a ‘full‘ admissibility check. A more in-depth analysis of admissibility – in 
particular, the existence and scope of competence – will be done only once all signatures are 
collected. Admittedly, such a solution is not favorable to the organisers. On the other hand, a 
full admissibility check at the stage of registration does not seem realistic as it would impose 
a very heavy workload on the Commission. Ultimately, it is the Court of Justice that has the 
final word in determining the existence of Union competence. Second, the proposed initiative 
should not be manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious. This refers to a scenario where the 
initiative is launched not in order to lead to the adoption of a legislative measure, but, e.g. for 
a euro-skeptic group to raise their visibility. Third, the initiative should not be manifestly 
contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 TEU. So, for instance, a proposed 
initiative should not violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Since the admissibility check 
takes place earlier, all matters pertaining to the content of a proposed measure are to be 
considered at the stage of registration. Non-respect of these limitations is sanctioned by 
refusal of registration.  
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Another issue that could be considered is whether through an ECI citizens could seek 
to amend existing EU secondary law or even request a Treaty amendment. To amend existing 
legislation would be admissible. In case of treaty amendment, it is the Commission who has 
power to submit proposal for revision to Council; however, Article 11(4) seems to exclude it, 
as an ECI is expected to focus on the purpose of ―implementing the Treaties‖. It has been 
suggested that an ECI can go as far as asking the Commission to propose to the Council to 
adopt a decision declaring the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State 
of the values referred to in Article 2.
27
 This is so since the application of Article 7 TEU does 
not imply Treaty changes. 
The organisers can also suggest the form, which the adopted act should take 
(regulation/ directive/ decision). For instance, if the objective is to achieve full harmonisation 
in a given area, instead than minimum harmonisation, a regulation would be more appropriate 
than a directive. In any case the Commission has the last word on this matter.   
 Formal requirements 
Upon registration, an initiative needs to state the title, the subject-matter and the 
objectives of a proposed legislative measure. The organisers need to provide regularly 
updated information about the sources of support and funding in order to guarantee full 
transparency. If all substantive and formal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has to 
register an initiative within two months.  
Quantitative element: number of signatures required 
In terms of quantitative requirements, according to the Treaty and the implementing 
regulation, a citizens‘ initiative needs to be signed by at least 1.000.000 citizens, a threshold 
which is not too difficult to reach in a Union of half a billion people (see section 4 for more 
details) and rather low by comparison with the requirements applied in different national 
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constitutional contexts. It should be noted that this requirement intervenes at the stage of 
examination by the Commission of the initiative. At the stage of registration no such threshold 
is set, as registration intervenes prior to initiating the collection of statements of support from 
signatories.  
Territorial element 
In order to ensure that a proposal is genuinely representative of a Union-wide interest, 
a territorial element was added to the abovementioned threshold. Indeed, the regulation 
establishes a double majority requirement. First, a ―significant number‖28 of Member States is 
defined by the regulation as ¼ of the Member States, meaning that the signatures have 
currently to come from at least 7 Member States. This is a welcome improvement compared 
to the more narrow 1/3 initially suggested by the Commission. Second, a minimum threshold 
of signatures has to be met in seven of the Member States, which is established by multiplying 
the number of MEPs of the Member States concerned by a factor of 750. It is worth noting 
that such a territorial distribution requirement is of federalist nature.
29
  
Establishing the thresholds: collecting statements of support 
Once the Commission has registered a proposed initiative, the organisers are 
responsible for collecting statements of support from signatories using specific forms 
provided for in the Regulation.
30
 This can be done both in paper form and electronically. 
Under Article 5(5) of the Regulation, all statements of support must be collected after the date 
of registration of the proposed initiative and within a 12-month deadline. Specific 
requirements apply to online collection systems: the online collection system has to be 
certified in the Member State in which the data collected will be stored. In addition, the online 
systems should have adequate security and technical features in place. Once all signatures are 
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  Auer, op. cit., p. 81.  
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  Article 5(1) of the Regulation on the citizens‘ initiative.  
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collected, the organisers must submit them to the Member States of origin / nationality of the 
signatories to allow them to verify them through appropriate checks within a period of 3 
months. The regulation provides for the possibility for the organisers to withdraw their 
proposal, but only prior to the submission of statements of support. If all conditions are 
complied with, the Commission has to examine the citizens' initiative and, within 3 months, 
set out in a communication its conclusions on the initiative, the action it intends to take, if 
any, and its reasons for doing so.    
Judicial review of the Commission’s decisions  
In the context of the process described above, the Commission adopts a legal act 
concerning a proposed ECI at two distinct stages: first, when considering admissibility at 
registration and, second, upon examination of a successfully registered proposal. At each of 
these two stages the Commission has certain duties and powers.  
Concerning the admissibility check, Article 4(3) of the Regulation states that the 
Commission has the power to refuse registration where the conditions laid down in paragraph 
2 are not met. Under Article 4(3), refusal of registration gives rise to certain obligations of the 
Commission: it has to inform the organisers of the reasons for refusal, as well as of all 
possible judicial and extrajudicial remedies available to them. The Regulation itself does not 
provide any further detail as to what the remedies in question are. It appears logical that, 
among the different acts that the Commission may adopt, a decision addressed to the 
organisers would be most appropriate. It is logical that the organisers should be able to 
challenge such a decision in the framework of an action for annulment under Article 263 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This article provides that any 
natural or legal person may introduce an action for judicial review of an act of the institutions 
(in this case – the Commission) addressed to that person. The ground for review invoked 
could be, for instance, an infringement of an essential procedural requirement where the 
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Commission fails to adequately justify its decision. Privileged applicants, the Member States, 
the Council and the European Parliament, could also challenge the refusal on similar grounds. 
One could imagine a scenario where the Parliament decides to challenge the Commission‘s 
refusal to register or follow-up on a proposal backed by the EP. 
Then, under Article 10 of the Regulation, the examination by the Commission of a 
registered proposal has to follow a specific procedure. In particular, it has to publish the 
initiative in the register, receive the organisers in order to give them an opportunity to explain 
the matters raised by their proposal and, finally, within 3 months, present in a communication 
its legal and political conclusions on the proposed initiative. In addition, it has to justify its 
decision to follow up or not. The communication has to be notified to the organisers and the 
EP, and has to be made public. Moreover, in the 3-month period, the organisers must be 
allowed to present the initiative in a public hearing at the European Parliament. The decision 
of the Commission at this stage – not to follow up or even to follow up on a proposal – can be 
challenged before the Court of Justice under Article 263 TFEU (see above).  
Concerning the standard of judicial review carried out by the judge, the greater the 
margin of discretion of the Commission, the more narrow the scope of review. The criteria to 
which the Commission has to refer to decide on registration of an ECI are clearly defined and, 
in consequence, judicial review will, most likely, be confined to the determination of whether 
the Commission has correctly applied these criteria. On the other hand, the decision of 
whether and how to follow up on a citizens‘ initiative gives a significant margin of 
appreciation to the Commission. It is, therefore, unlikely that the judge would examine in 
depth the legal and political reasons which led the Commission to take action or not. 
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Contribution to the political system of the EU 
One of the important questions is the possible impact of the ECI as implemented by 
Member States. Surely, at this stage, it is difficult to predict how many ECIs will be 
registered, how many of them will be declared admissible, how many of them will gather the 
required 1 million signatures of citizens coming from the specified number of countries, and 
finally how many among those that received the required number of signatures would result in 
the proposition of legislation coming from the European Commission. Nevertheless, it seems 
fit to reflect upon the possible impact the ECI might have on the institutional system of the 
EU. 
It seems that the European Commission will have a crucial role when it comes to the 
possible impact of the ECI. It is so, not only because it will play an important role for ECIs 
from the technical point of view, but even more so, because it can be the most strongly 
affected by this new instrument of participatory democracy.  
The first challenge for the Commission will occur at the moment of the registration of 
initiatives. From the political point of view, as far as the admissibility check should be done at 
the registration of the procedure, the Commission might find itself under pressure to ―judge 
politically sensitive issues (at an early stage), although these might not even stand a chance of 
reaching the one-million threshold‖.31 In addition to that, there is a possibility that several 
contradictory or competing initiatives could be presented, and the Commission might need to 
decide which of them it would or would not register and why.  
Furthermore, there is also a practical aspect of the ECI that might become a burden for 
the European Commission. The implementation of the ECI could possibly increase the 
workload of the Commission, which is given a considerable number of duties. In terms of 
infrastructure, the Commission has to make available and maintain software for online 
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collection of signatures, as well as related support services. It will have to provide a regularly 
updated guide on the citizens‘ initiative. Additionally, it will have to set up a help desk for 
organisers and keep them informed about current or intended legislative proposals related to 
their initiative or related ECIs. Furthermore, the Commission will have to enter into a 
dialogue with the organisers at an early stage of the procedure. Significantly, the Commission 
should give organisers of a successful ECI the opportunity to present their initiative at a 
public hearing. It would be impossible for the Commission to neglect or overlook this duty 
since the hearing has to take place in the Parliament, and the MEPs are eager to oversee the 
Commission‘s follow-up of initiatives that gathered over 1,000,000 signatures.  
Subsequently and more importantly, the Commission will be under close scrutiny 
because the ECI‘s political ―impact and importance will entirely depend on the definition of 
the powers of the Commission as the addressee of the ECI‖.32 The European Commission will 
have to find a balanced position for itself on the scale going from total submission towards 
total control. Andreas Auer describes the total submission position as one of a ―mere 
connecting link‖33 between the signatories of an ECI and the European legislators (the 
European Parliament and the European Council); the total control position would mean that 
the Commission would be refraining from putting ECIs through, even if they met all the 
formal requirements, purely at its own discretion. Finding a right balance between these two 
options seems vital, because in case of total submission, the Commission will see its position 
deteriorating, while in case of total control, it would degrade the newly implemented 
procedure and might also reinforce the perception of itself as technocratic, distant, even non-
democratic institution.  
Hence, it seems that for ECI to be successful in contributing to foster the pan-
European debates and enhance the European democracy, it needs not only to be user-friendly, 
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on the technical level, but also it will need the political support of the Commission. As Mehr 
Demokratie (2010), a civil society organization that calls for fostering direct democracy at the 
European level, underscores,  
―ECI offers significant possibilities for the development of European civil 
society and of European public space and thus for democracy itself at the EU 
level – as long as the Commission, as the intended recipient of such 
initiatives, makes active use of the opportunity the ECI presents for engaging 
intensively with the citizens‖.  
 
If we imagine a situation when an ECI is registered, then passes positively the control 
of admissibility, and gathers the necessary signatures, it might be a challenge for the 
Commission to decide not to initiate corresponding legislation. If this happens, one could 
think of the possibility of the European Parliament stepping in and questioning the 
Commission or a specific Commissioner about the reasons for the rejection of a specific ECI, 
beyond the reasons provided in the communication from the Commission on this subject.  
When it comes to forecasting the prospective number of registered or successful ECIs, 
previous examples of European-wide initiatives might serve as an indicator. In fact, as far as 
the idea of ECI emerged within the Convention on the future of Europe, and was included in 
the Constitutional Treaty, many civil society organisations started collecting signatures and 
calling them ECIs, even if, in the end, the Constitutional Treaty has never entered into force. 
Still, these signature-collection campaigns can be perceived as examples of ECIs avant la 
lettre. Between 2004 and 2007, at least 20 such initiatives were launched in diverse fields, 
such as health, energy, education, social welfare, foreign aid, and European institutions.
34
 
These initiatives were promoted by different actors: foundations, associations, MEPs, NGOs, 
etc. The collection of signatures was most often electronic, but also on paper, sometimes with 
a built-in verification procedure.  
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The experience of these initiatives (many of which kept referring to themselves as 
‗petitions‘) was, to Bruno Kaufmann‘s mind,35 instructive for the future, and showed a 
necessity of clear organisation and management of the procedure. They also showed that it is 
possible to gather one million signatures in a short period of time.   
Bruno Kaufmann takes the ―One seat‖ initiative that called for having only one seat 
for the European Parliament (Brussels) as a case study.
36
 A European Parliament Member 
launched it. It managed to collect the required number of signatures in four months. However, 
this success could not have been taken advantage of, as far as the signatures were collected 
only electronically, and no proper verification procedure could have been supplied. This 
shows that a proper system for signature collection is vital for the successful outcome of such 
initiatives.   
Certainly, there might be fields in which collection of signatures should seem easier 
than others, because there are strong networks of NGOs and other civil society organizations 
across Europe, e.g. health protection, human rights, animal welfare, etc. On this note, it might 
be interesting to invoke Greenpeace. During 18 months, between 2005 and 2007, it collected 
over one million signatures in favour of labeling dairy and animal products, where animals 
were fed GMO food.
37
 On this occasion, signatures were collected in 21 EU countries, most 
of them in countries where Greenpeace has strong regional offices. Over 990,000 signatures 
were collected on paper. And in the end, Greenpeace was successful in putting its concerns on 
the European agenda, because the institutions reacted positively to the deposited proposal.
38
  
By the beginning of December 2010, Greenpeace managed yet again to collect more 
than a million signatures of European citizens in favour of a ban on genetically modified 
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organisms. Even if Greenpeace insisted on labelling their initiative an ECI, referring to Article 
11(4) of the, by the time of collection of signature the regulation on the ECI procedure was 
not yet implemented. Hence, the European Commission maintained its opinion that it cannot 
be considered an ECI. Nevertheless, it promised to study the view expressed in this 
‗petition‘.39 It is not sure, how it will be treated subsequently. All the same, it shows that 
citizens are ready to sign important to their mind initiatives, and an organization can gather a 
substantial number of signatures in a short period of time, even without the help from the 
European Commission.  
It is certain that the prospective success of ECIs will depend on the strength of civil 
society organisations advocating specific causes, and also on their uprooting in different 
European countries, or networking with different organizations in the same field. It will also 
depend on citizens and their perception of the new instrument, and their willingness to seize it 
and advocate questions close to their hearts. Surely, the initial stage of the existence of the 
new instrument can have strong consequences over its prospective use and development. If 
the first ECIs would collect signatures required by the regulation, and if the Commission 
would take it up in a legislative proposal, then it could influence even more people to put 
forward their projects. However, if the first ECIs launched in 2012 would fail in collecting 
signatures, or the Commission would massively reject them, it could discourage people from 
using this instrument, and it would be also counterproductive in its aim to give citizens more 
opportunities to participate, and to reduce the alleged ‗democratic deficit‘.  
It is true that even if the Commission decides to present a legislative proposal based 
upon a successful ECI, it is not the end of the process. First of all, the legislative proposal of 
the Commission could alter the substance of an ECI and thus discontent its signatories. 
Second, even if a legislative proposal would reflect perfectly the will of the signatories of a 
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specific ECI, it still might stumble either in the Council, or in the Parliament. It is a possible, 
even if unlikely, scenario, insofar as usually the Commission consults its proposals with other 
institutions prior to presenting them officially, in order to ensure their prospective success. 
But even if a legislative proposal resulting from an ECI was not voted on by one of the 
legislative branches of the EU, it still seems as a ‗lesser evil‘ than if the Commission 
promoted a total control approach and decided not to follow up on any, or only on very few, 
ECIs.  
When it comes to the question of whether the ECI could be a remedy to the alleged 
'democratic deficit' of the EU, it still seems that the Commission is the main player here. If it 
finds a balanced way to deal with successful ECIs, then the citizens will not think that their 
voices and opinions remain unheard, and the perception of institutional distance might be 
bridged, no matter whether a proposal would pass or not. Of course, ideally, the Commission's 
proposal would be adopted, and in this case the citizens would be fully satisfied. However, 
even if it were not adopted, already the fact of it being considered by the Commission and 
triggering a debate in the Parliament and Council could be enough for citizens to feel that 
their opinions are not being neglected. Of course, it would all depend on reasons of rejections 
of such a proposal. Nevertheless, one could imagine that a rejection of such a proposal would 
be less detrimental to the prospective role of the ECI in bringing citizens closer to institutions, 
than a Commission's decision not to follow up on ECIs that succeeded in gathering the 
necessary number of signatures.   
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